Global Security Programme
Occasional Paper No. 7
May 1995
Occasional Paper No. 7
THE PLANETARY INTEREST
Kennedy Graham
Quatercentary Fellow
Emmanuel College
University of Cambridge
May 1995
CONTENTS
Introduction
The "Common Interest": A Precursor
The "National Interest"
The "Planetary Interest"
The "Planetary Interest" and the "Legitimate National Interest"
Three Case Studies:
- Ozone Protection
- Climate Stabilization
- Carrying Capacity
Conclusion
_________________________________________________________________________
Dr. Graham is Secretary-General of Parliamentarians for Global
Action, New York. He wrote this Paper during his Quatercentenary
Visiting Fellowship at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. The views expressed
herein are advanced in his personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect
the views of Parliamentarians for Global Action.
_________________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Future historians may find that the world of the late twentieth century experienced a paradigm shift as profound as the Copernican four hundred years ago when it became accepted, not without pain, that Earth was not the centre of the universe. Through space exploration and the transport, communications and information revolutions, we are in a turbulent transition to a new age. It is best described as the "global age", and it is captured most simply and eloquently in the breathtakingly beautiful image of Earth from lunar orbit on Christmas Eve 1968. The Apollo 8 photograph has become the icon of the global age, symbolic of its portent and evoking a new and nurturing attitude toward the planet that had not been present in the popular mind before.
From the earlier industrial age, however, humanity has inherited problems which, in the new age, have themselves become global. As we prepare to enter the 21st century, the international community faces problems that demonstrably threaten the planet: climate change, ozone depletion, resource stress and the continuing risk of nuclear devastation. There was general agreement among the experts in the view of the Ward-Dubos Report commissioned for the UN Environment Conference of 1972, "that environmental problems are becoming increasingly world-wide and therefore demand a global approach". Global questions, said the 1980 independent Brandt Report on development, require global answers. "Since there is now a risk of mankind destroying itself, this risk must be met by new methods".
Grappling with global problems today is the recognized task of some 200 nation-states, each claiming independent and sovereign powers. This presents us with difficulties: the threats faced are of a magnitude that transcends the nation-state, yet the principal unit for dealing with such issues remains the nation-state. The scale of policy-making falls short of the scale of the problem by an order of magnitude. The interests of humanity suffer accordingly.
Excepting violent revolution and cataclysm, political change in the world proceeds at an evolutionary pace. The formation of political units and the bestowal of legitimate authority on leaders proceeds slowly, and for good reason. The nation-state system, the highest political unit developed by humanity, is some four centuries old. The fundamental political characteristic of the nation-state is its sovereign independence. The planet became a closed political system, a world-wide grid of sovereign nation-states, only a few decades ago. Humanity has yet to agree upon a system of governance for the planet as a whole. The political evolution of the human world is not complete, even in the simplest, most basic sense of a single, self-governing unit.
The world polity is not a single unit. There is no single sovereign, no Leviathan with legitimate authority and enforcement power bestowed through the democratic process involving the informed consent of the peoples of the world. Were it so, the sovereign could conceive of a single interest on behalf of all humankind whom it would represent, formulate strategy and execute policy in pursuit of such an interest. But this is not the case.
Thus the reason for, and the subject of, this Paper: the compelling
need for a facilitating concept that can trigger action in a time of transition,
a single interest of a magnitude commensurate with the scale of the problems
faced.
THE "COMMON INTEREST": A PRECURSOR
The idea of a political, as opposed to a philosophical, interest higher
than the national interest is quite new, but it is already established
in political and juridical thought. Barbara Ward's pioneering work
of the mid-1960s spoke of "Spaceship Earth":
"The most rational way of seeing the whole human race today is
to see it as the ship's crew of a single space ship on which all of us,
with a remarkable combination of security and vulnerability, are making
our pilgrimage through infinity. Our planet is not much more than
the capsule within which we have to live as human beings if we are to survive
the vast space voyage upon which we have been engaged for hundreds of millennia,
but without yet noticing our condition. This space voyage is totally
precarious. We depend upon a little envelope of soil and a rather
larger envelope of atmosphere for life itself. .... We are a ship's
company on a small ship. Rational behavior is the condition of survival."*
The independent commissions established over the past two decades have
promoted the political concept of a "common interest" of humanity.
The 1982 Palme Commission concluded that "our discussions over almost two
years ... convinced us of the urgency of working together for common interests".
Our inability to promote the "common interest in sustainable development",
said the 1987 Brundlandt Report on Environment, was often the product of
a relative neglect of economic and social justice. The 1995 Carlsson-Ramphal
Report postulated that "the idea that people have common interests irrespective
of their national or other identities and that they are coming together
in an organized way across borders to address these is of increasing relevance
to global governance."
The nearest thing to a global conscience, as opposed to a global sovereign, is the voice of the UN Secretary-General. Successive incumbents have consistently referred to a "common" or a "higher" interest. As early as 1950, Trygve Lie spoke of the "true interests of the world at large". In 1960, Dag Hammarskjold believed that UN Member States would find it "increasingly necessary to maintain [the UN's] strength as an instrument for the world community ... in efforts to resolve problems ... in a spirit reflecting the common overriding interests." U Thant contended that "all governments have an overriding, long-term, common interest in protecting and preserving the framework of peaceful international communications and the simple rules of responsible behavior on which human society is necessarily based." And in the early post-Cold War era in 1991, Javier Perez de Cuellar noted that "the unique opportunity that is now being presented to the world should be the subject of reasoned discussion and negotiation in the best interests of the world community. ... The way we treat the new generation of global problems that now confront humanity may very well determine the quality of life for all peoples living on the planet."
The "common interest" has recently been referred to as the "planetary interest". In March 1994, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali contended that "states have always defined their national interests. Today, States must be prepared to accommodate the concept of a common -- global or planetary -- interest".
In the political world, a parliamentarian group, Parliamentarians for Global Action, has articulated the concept of the "planetary interest" since the early 1990s. "The hallmark of our organization" said its President, Senator Silvia Hernandez of Mexico in 1993, "is the "planetary interest" -- perceiving the world as a single whole, and responding, politically, with global solutions that reflect an enlightened national interest, not one that is narrowly conceived and competitively pursued."
____________________________
* Sources of quotes used in this Paper are not listed, but may be obtained
from the author.
At the UN General Assembly, nation-states are giving rhetorical voice to the global concept. In 1993 the United States President refers to the need to "take stock of where we are as common shareholders in the progress of humankind and the preservation of the planet." One of his cabinet ministers asserts that "we all have to bring a global vision to the decisions we make; and we have to feel a sense of personal responsibility for all the people and all the countries with which we share this beautiful planet." A foreign minister advances his country's draft resolution on the grounds that it "is intended to advance global interests". The president of another sees the UN as "the most privileged forum for harmonizing the global interests of all peoples of the world...".
Juridical thought has, if anything, preceded political thought in developing the "higher interest". This idea entered customary international law in 1970 when UN General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV) referred to the "common interest of mankind" in the seabed and the ocean floor. Treaty law, however, was already developing these concepts in more formal manner. The UN Charter itself states that "We the peoples of the United Nations [are] determined ... that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest". The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 refers to the "interest of all mankind" in the exclusively peaceful use of the continent. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 claims, with a sublime anthropocentrism that could yet come to haunt us, that all celestial bodies shall be the "province of all mankind". The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 introduced the seminal concept of the "common heritage of mankind" in referring to the seabed and ocean floor. The Moon Treaty of 1979, also, sees the moon as the common heritage. And the Climate Change and Biodiversity conventions of 1992 perceive their subject areas as matters of a "common concern of humankind". Clearly, the concept has entered the establishment of late-twentieth century legal theory.
In political reality, however, the world remains fragmented. The UN Charter, having opened in the name of the peoples of the United Nations, thereafter rests firmly on the principle of the sovereign equality of Member States. The UN is a "centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of [the] common ends" of peace, self-determination, economic progress and human rights. Yet without any objective guiding concept and any objective higher authority, the outcome of efforts to "harmonize the actions of nations" is an imperfect product, reflecting the differentiated power structure between nation-states as disparate as China and Tuvalu and the vagaries of political and diplomatic winds at any one time.
Thus the practical need for a facilitating political concept which helps
both government and citizen to make the transition from the nation-state
age to the global age. And the concept, while rooted in abstraction,
must be capable of being operationalized, for practical political action.
THE "NATIONAL INTEREST"
It is axiomatic that every socio-political unit has an "interest". There is the individual and the family interest, expressed at the municipal and national levels through electoral and other civic activity. There is, to take one Western system as an example, the county interest, expressed through municipal activity and parliamentary activity at the national level. There is the national interest, expressed at the international level in UN voting, diplomatic negotiations and other forms of nation-state activity. There is a regional and a transnational interest, expressed by nation-states co-operating or integrating within a region or along lines of a particular concern. And there is the planetary interest, which as yet is hardly expressed at all. The concept of interest validly attends any such identifiable unit. The strength or weakness of that concept correlates closely with the importance and vigor of the unit.
At present, the national interest commands the overwhelming focus of political attention in global affairs. Other influences are at play -- most notably transnational business and non-governmental organizations involving both professional and citizen activity. But the national interest, as conceived and formulated by the governments of nation-states, remains the well-established concept that still drives political decisions and policies in the modern world. Constitutionally and politically, each nation is bound to look after its own interests, to make its own way in the world and seek its own fortune. Leaders are elected by the citizens of each nation to serve them alone, and when they take office they formally swear under oath to do so. Citizens are bound to acknowledge and give obeisance to the national sovereign, and to defend the nation with arms and with their life. The law of treason, the act of betraying one's country, remains the highest crime in domestic law, carrying severe political odium and generally earning the highest penalty. Nations carry all the trappings of group identity: the flag, the armed forces, the airline, the currency, the postage stamp and, not least, the sports team. Government officials sign secrecy oaths to protect information acquired on a "need-to-know" basis. Risks to national security, real or perceived, are treated with the utmost seriousness, and can fundamentally alter lives, through exile, imprisonment, or suicide. And in what may become known as one of the greater anomalies of human history, the first men on the moon planted a national flag.
Above all, the value system of the polis -- the citizens and their leaders -- remains, in the 1990s, national. In his most recent State of the Union address, the US President declares: "As we embark on a new course, let us put our country first, remembering that regardless of our party beliefs, we are all Americans. Let the final test of any action be a simple one: is it good for the American people? ... The New Covenant unites us behind a common vision of what's best for our country."
As with values, so with policy. Memoranda prepared by the bureaucracy for ministers of government present analysis and argumentation in the name of the national interest. The national interest is the most powerful political concept in the world today. It is the principal criterion on which political leaders -- heads of government and ministerial colleagues -- make their decisions. In the conduct of "external affairs", the foreign policy of one state towards others, the national interest is explicitly invoked; in domestic issues, it is assumed.
At international conferences and negotiations such as those at the United Nations, the national interest forms the basis of Member States' perceptions and policy objectives. The official briefs which diplomats carry to these meetings specify their national objectives, with instructions to the delegations on how to achieve them. The diplomats are tightly constrained, and usually can diverge from their briefs only upon new instructions from capitals.
As with so many political concepts that are rooted in values, a definition of the "national interest" is relatively simple for the practical purposes of political action, relatively complex for the refined rigor of academic enquiry. The concept is invoked on the basis of what is "best for the country", as the President's appeal cited above demonstrates and as the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences confirms. Although 16th-century Italy and 17th-century England first started using the concept as a replacement to the "will of the prince" and an alternative to the "divine reason of the Pope", it is only the 20th-century international community that has used it as the standard referent for political action, as the nation-state system became universal and the public stake in international affairs and foreign policy grew.
The principal challenge surrounding the concept turns over the objective and subjective versions of the concept: is there an objective national interest that exists for a country whether or not citizens and leaders correctly perceive it, or is the national interest comprised of whatever the nation-state, through its ever-evolving values and political process determine it to be at any one time: did Hitler's policies represent the German national interest or not? Whatever the answer might be, it is generally accepted that Morgenthau's dictum of the 1940s still holds, that "the objectives of a foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest" and the application of national power is the medium through which nation-states follow "but one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action: the national interest".
As a general rule, the national interest may be defined as:
"the interests of a nation-state, including the integrity of
its territory and the welfare of its people based on its particular national
values, formulated through its particular political process, and articulated
by its leaders in terms of national aspirations, goals and policies."
In the context of political action, two levels of national interest are generally cited. The higher level is the "supreme national interest" or "vital national interest" of a nation-state. The "supreme national interest" is cited in arms control treaties as the justification for withdrawal. The "vital national interest" is cited as justification for threatening or undertaking military action, or applying non-violent but severe measures such as economic sanctions, whether lawfully through the UN or extra-legally in a unilateral move. "Vital national interests" traditionally concern the defence of national territory, access to energy sources, security of transport and communication lines, and control of key industrial assets. They are the issues for which leaders will call upon their citizens to pay the ultimate sacrifice, and what the village cenotaph stands for, the villager having paid it.
The lower level is the "normal" national interest. This traditionally concerns two objectives: the peaceful promotion of national values that form the consensual basis for the national society and which the country may wish to see emulated around the world; and peaceful competition for the largest slice of the global economic cake. Some, not all, major powers are more concerned than others to see their national values, generally their version of political truth and human rights, promoted around the world. But the "normal national interest" falls short of resorting to force.
What is construed to be in the vital national interest is subject to
change over time as nation-states move tectonically together, politically
and economically. The recent UN-authorized US intervention in Haiti
(militarily) and in Mexico (financially) illustrate the broadening of the
notion of vital national interest, together with serious US bilateral moves
vis-a-vis China over patent rights. An ambivalence, reflecting the
transitional stage of contemporary human values, concerns humanitarian
intervention in countries suffering severe socio-economic plight.
THE "PLANETARY INTEREST"
In the emerging global age, the question arises whether the planetary interest can be assessed in a similar manner. Are there "vital planetary interests", as opposed to "normal planetary interests", that can be identified to help clarify the perception of nation-states as they grapple with global problems in the 1990s?
To consider this it is necessary first to develop a definition of the "planetary interest". This is new territory, and any first attempt at a definition of so all-embracing a concept can only be tentative. But a preliminary definition is useful in order to begin to delineate the subject matter more clearly and develop different levels of the planetary interest for more detailed analysis.
Thus, the "planetary interest" might be defined as:
"the interests of the planet as a whole and humanity as a single
group, involving:
- maintenance of the physical integrity of Earth and the
protection of its ecological system from major anthropogenic
change; and
- the universal improvement in the human condition in terms
of basic human needs and fundamental human rights."
Nothing contained in this definition is not already on the agenda of the international community. Its potential lies in capturing the fundamental aims of humanity in one operational concept.
What criteria can be developed for knowing when the planetary interest is applicable? Three criteria are most obviously relevant: scale, severity and time-period. The first two are determinative variables; the third is a consequential factor. All three elucidate the issue. Something concerns the planetary interest if it materially affects, not necessarily uniformly, the planet as opposed to the region or the nation-state alone, and humanity as opposed to the national community. It concerns the planetary interest if it threatens to alter the current integrity, the present state of being, of the planet, or threatens to alter the human condition. And the planetary interest is involved whether or not that threat extends beyond the current generation. Because of the magnitude of scale and severity, the planetary interest is usually more clearly apparent over the longer term. Normally, the national interest is more prevalent over the planetary interest in the shorter term. With the passage of time, the national interest and the planetary interest are seen to have a closer fit.
Such a definition and set of criteria allow further analytical exploration. Two levels of the planetary interest might thus be perceived:
* The "vital planetary interest" would have to do with the physical
integrity of Earth and its protection from major anthropogenic change.
It would be applied to issues relating to the "fundamental health"
of the planet, that is to say, the continuation of the planet
in its current state of being.
* The "normative planetary interest" would have to do with the
universal improvement in the human condition in terms of basic human
needs and fundamental human rights.
It would be applied to issues concerning the quality of life
of all peoples around the world, and implicitly invoke
a frame of values attributable to the
global referent.
Examples of the "vital planetary interest" would be global climate stabilization; stratospheric ozone protection; and strategic stability at minimum levels of weapons of mass destruction.
Examples of the "normative planetary interest" would be a minimum global standard of living for all nations in terms of the basic human needs of shelter, food security, health, and environmental harmony for their citizens; and development of a common global ethic that would underpin observation of universal human rights.
The "planetary interest" in sustainable development, that is to say, the maintenance of the planet's carrying capacity, needs careful consideration. It can be maintained that sustainable development is, axiomatically, in the "vital planetary interest" since unsustainable development would seriously degrade the planet. But must a nation-state live within the constraints of nationally-sustainable development? A possible answer is that global sustainable development is in the "vital planetary interest", while nation-states are, at present, free in international law to engage in nationally-unsustainable development, which is, for better or worse, partially compensated for through the actions of other states. As Case Study C. will show, this may need to change.
Much is left implicit in the definition. Some issues (clean water
as an example) reflect both aspects -- the physical integrity of the Earth
and basic human needs. Other issues (such as global food security)
raise the question whether there might be a conflict within the definition,
if the physical integrity of the Earth suffers in order to feed an unsustainable
population size. This is explored further below.
THE "PLANETARY INTEREST" AND THE "LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INTEREST"
An intrinsic link may be seen to exist between the national interests of nation-states and the planetary interest of the world community. Addressing the British Parliament in 1958, Dag Hammarskjold observed that the United Nations was the natural development from lines of thought reaching back in time "since a few men first began to think about the decency and dignity of other men". Now, said Hammarskjold, "the lines between national and international policy have begun to blur. What is in the national interest, when truly seen, merges naturally into the international interest." Twenty-two years later the Brandt Report affirmed that its aim was to point out the immense risks threatening mankind and that "the legitimate self-interest of nations often merge into well-understood common interests". In February 1995, the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, expressed the desire, following the American-French espionage dispute, that French-American relations would continue to be based on "mutual trust" and "mutual respect for each others' legitimate national interests".
How might the "legitimate national interest" be identified and defined? As with certain other concepts, it is perhaps more instructive to define it by exclusion, through what might be perceived to be an "illegitimate national interest". It is an "illegitimate national interest" to grossly pollute a neighboring state; to degrade the global commons; to engage in an act that would devastate the planet. Is this a valid way of defining the concept? Such an approach is similar to the perception of citizen responsibilities, which are defined more by circumscription of prohibited behavior (murder, arson, stealing, fraud) than by positive identification of rights or other lawful action. A citizen's freedom extends to the point beyond which it interferes with that of others. Anything not thus prohibited is lawful behavior. Similarly, anything that is not illegitimate national behavior may be undertaken as a "legitimate national interest".
This notion of a "legitimate national interest" is critical to the future of the planet. It is closely tied in with the "Principle of Good Faith" of the UN Charter in which all Member States "shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter". This requires, it has been advanced, that Member States assuming membership of the Security Council, including the permanent members, have regard for an interest higher than their own national interest in their actions on the Council. This has, of course, not always been the case, but the Charter principle and the "legitimate national interest" of a country are closely related. It is significant that the Principle of Good Faith was reaffirmed in 1992 as one of the 27 principles in the Rio Declaration, and also in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (article 300) which came into force in 1994.
The two concepts of the "planetary interest" and the "legitimate national interest" are also closely aligned with a new concept emerging in customary international law, namely the "international public interest" as developed and articulated by Professor Phillip Allot. The international system, says, Allot, relies on the internal social aggregation process of each state system that enables a government to represent the national interest internationally. The interaction of the aggregated national interests, however, takes on a life of its own: instead of aggregating individual and sub-national interests into "a collective, so-called international interest", the respective aggregations at the state-system level become original interests themselves. Thus the system gives effect neither to universal social objectives of humanity nor to the social objectives of all human individuals collectivized through the state system. It has taken time, and it will take an intellectual effort, to make a change of perspective in relation to the social organization of the world. This involves transferring the notional centre of gravity of international society from the level of the state systems to the level of the totality of humanity, from the level of the separate national territories to the level of the whole earth. The notional centre of gravity of a society is to be found in the idea of the public interest. "So long as international society lacks any conception of the public interest of international society as a whole, its social process will remain vestigial and primitive." Thus the need for a new concept which Allott terms the "international public interest".
It is on these juridical and theoretical premises that the concepts of the "planetary interest" and the "legitimate national interest" naturally rest, and can be developed.
The fundamental premises of this Paper are that:
"whatever is in the "vital planetary interest" requires that
a nation-state pursue a "legitimate national interest"";
and, as a corollary:
"any national policy which goes beyond the "legitimate national
interest" violates the "vital planetary interest".
In addressing global problems, a nation-state will pursue a national
brief that reflects the "national interest" formulated in the capital.
Generally, an official delegation will have an opening negotiating position
and a fallback position. The opening position is generally the maximum
that a nation-state believes it might conceivably aspire to secure in the
negotiations. The fallback position is the minimum it will be prepared
to accept without walking out. The opening position is generally
excessive and unduly demanding, at least as perceived by other states.
Yet in alleging this, other states cannot avoid the criticism that they,
too, are acting from the subjective perspective of their own national interests.
Powerful states generally attain an outcome closer to their opening position
than smaller states. What objective criterion can be used to judge
what is acceptable? The "legitimate national interest" can be seen
as a conceptual means of determining what is acceptable to all in the "vital
planetary interest".
THREE CASE STUDIES:
Analysis of the relationship between the "planetary interest" and the "legitimate national interest" can be explored in three case studies. Two reflect the "vital planetary interest"; one reflects the "normative planetary interest". The first, ozone protection, is an example of negotiations that have been completed. The second, climate stability, is an example of negotiations under way. The third, the global carrying capacity, is an example of potential discussion and negotiation in the future.
A. Ozone Protection
The 1987 Montreal Protocol imposed binding obligations on parties of national cuts from 1986 CFC production and consumption levels of 20% by 1994 and 50% by 1999. One major exception to the "national-global" formula was entered: in the name of global equity to atone for historical emissions by the North, a concession was entered for the South in which developing countries could defer the phase-out regime over a ten-year grace period provided their annual per capita consumption remained below 0.3 kg.. The result is that the intended goal of global emission reductions would be achieved, but by an indeterminable amount and through collective national reductions.
The 1990 London and 1992 Copenhagen revisions were based on the same methodology. States agreed once more on national cuts, increasingly severe in each case. The Copenhagen amendment requires a 75% reduction in CFCs by January 1995 and 100% by 1996; 100% in halons by 1995; 85% reduction in CTs by 1995 and 100% by 1997; 50% reduction in MCs by 1995 and 100% by 1997; and progressive reductions in HCFCs with phase-out by 2031. We are still in that regime today.
Without explicitly invoking the term, the international community essentially concluded that the "vital planetary interest" in protection of the global ozone layer required a rapid national phaseout of CFC-related substances by 2000 at the latest. The retrospective question underlying the Montreal-London experience is the extent to which the "legitimate national interests" and policies of states answered, over the course of the negotiations, to that planetary interest.
In considering the "legitimate national interests" of nation-states in face of global problems, two categories, national responsibility and national need (protection from damage), are relevant.
In the early stage of the ozone problem, the "responsible" states were few, with the US producing 46% of the global share in 1974, the EEC 38%, and Japan and the USSR most of the remainder. The "victim" states were also few: Australia and New Zealand, Chile and Argentina, all situated close to the Antarctic. With ozone, the lines of national demarcation for the global problem were relatively simple. Generally, the national interests of the southern hemisphere "demandeur states" in combatting ozone depletion were the strongest of all states, given the nature of what was then a regional problem. Yet of these, only New Zealand took the lead in the early negotiations, and other concerned states -- the Nordics, Switzerland, Canada and the US -- were not at that stage victims. As evidence of ozone depletion spread to the northern hemisphere, all states developed a national interest in combatting a global problem. The southern states, moreover, did not have to contend with national commercial considerations, which made their negotiating positions clearer. With the exception of the US, the northern hemisphere-producing states, with a weaker initial national interest in mitigating the damage and stronger commercial considerations, took longer to accept a global control regime.
In the case of ozone, the early action was led by the main responsible state, the US, with national legislation in 1977 in the form of its Stratospheric Ozone Protection Amendment to the US Clean Air Act and an intergovernmental meeting where the idea of global controls was raised for the first time. The same year, three Nordic states, Canada and the US proposed consideration of controls at the UNEP Governing Council meeting, and in 1983 urged a protocol for binding controls and a global ban on non-essential CFC uses in spray cans. The EC, however, was not prepared to negotiate any form of reduction of CFC production or use and, with Japan and USSR, rejected the idea of an international regulatory regime.
The US negotiating stance reflected a particular national interest. Reflecting a heightened environmental awareness, the US public had cut its own consumption of aerosol sprays, while US industry had applied early effort into research for alternatives. The US was therefore ahead of European producers in being able to move away from existing CFC production practices. The proposal for a ban on non-essential aerosol use would hurt US interests relatively less than French interests: the French perfume industry saw CFC alternatives as more readily applicable to US insecticides than French perfumes. Yet the US move, in terms of research cost and market uncertainties, required a national commitment and sacrifice nonetheless: some 100 million refrigerators, 90 million vehicle air conditioners, and many thousand office air conditioners were subject to replacement.
In terms of national economic importance, however, US production was less critical than in the EC, being about two-thirds of the share in the EC as percentage of GNP. And whereas the US consumed almost all of its national production, the EC exported nearly one-third. Britain, in particular, exported 33%, while a large proportion of its CFC production and consumption (80% in 1974; 60% in 1986) was comprised of aerosols, one of the most damaging items. As a result the British national interest, and also that of France and Italy, were driven strongly by commercial considerations.
Subsequently, when European environmental awareness intensified, the EC proposed its own protocol, which would ban any growth in CFC production capacity. This proposal, however, was geared to European interests since a production capacity ceiling would allow the European industry, with excess capacity, to continue expanding at current rates for a further 20 years, to the detriment of the ozone layer. It would also have had the effect of freezing existing market shares, and would disadvantage US companies with no surplus capacity.
For its part, Japan acquired an efficiency in recovering over 95% of CFC solvents, enabling it over the longer term to relax its initial opposition to global regulations. The USSR was accommodated with a "grandfather clause" in the Protocol which allowed for its planned growth in production capacity, already legislated for prior to the base year, to proceed.
Important national interests were also pursued by the populous countries of the South. China and India, with 40% of the global population, were minimal CFC producers. Were they to expand their use of CFCs for refrigeration and other purposes, the effect of the Protocol would be nullified. The "vital planetary interest" lay in assisting these two states to develop CFC alternatives before undue capital investment was made in traditional CFC production technologies. China's CFC consumption had risen by 20% annually during the 1980s. Initial estimates of phase-out costs were $1 billion, but a special expert group visit to China reported that only $42 m. would be required. China not only accepted the Report, but also indicated that it did not plan to make use of the ten-year grace period, preferring to move quickly to new technologies and avoid contributing further to ozone damage.
What can be concluded from the ozone experience? The negotiations are an example of nation-states struggling to merge national commercial interests with a new-found sense of global responsibility. Those commercial interests themselves can be influenced by consumer awareness or apathy, industry imagination or lack thereof, governmental leadership or inertia, and competing negotiating skills. Running through the whole debate, however, was the deepening conviction on the part of all that the interests of the planet must be met, anthropomorphically represented in the interests of humanity in avoiding global damage to health and crops, however regionally skewed it might be. The planetary interest served as a lodestar, even though the concept was not articulated. In due course, the excessive national positions of certain States in the early stages of the negotiations gave way to policy modifications, as the "legitimate national interest" of each State was reformulated to answer to that guiding concept.
B. Climate stability
Climate change, the "common concern of humankind", poses a more complex problem to the international community, its causes being more integral to the functioning of modern society and the daily personal lifestyle. Four contributing agents are involved with various aspects of lifestyle being responsible within each one: carbon dioxide (through fossil fuel burning, cement-making and deforestation); methane (through natural wetlands, rice cultivation, coal-mining, gas pipeline leaks, and enteric fermentation from livestock); nitrous oxide from organic soil compounds, and CFCs. In addition, statistics are not readily available in some cases, and long time-periods are involved for assessing causal effects.
Climate change is likely to be manifest in temperature rise, wind pattern changes, precipitation changes, and changes in ocean circulation. The temperature rise is the one most popularly understood, with its consequent sea-level rise, but the other effects could be equally detrimental to national interests. The 1990 IPCC Report predicted that, under a "business as usual" scenario, the global mean temperature would rise by 1 degree Celsius by 2025, and 3 degrees before 2100. Sea-level rise is expected to be 0.2 meters by 2030, and 0.65 meters by 2100.
As with ozone depletion, analysis of climate change shows both "responsible
states" and "victim states". Generally, it is well known that the
North, and the United States in particular, is responsible for GHG emissions.
The IPCC measure has the "top ten" states collectively contributing some
63% of global warming, viz.:
1. United States 18.4% 6. Brazil
3.9%
2. former USSR 13.6% 7. Germany
3.4%
3. China 9.1% 8. United Kingdom
2.2%
4. Japan 4.7% 9. Mexico
2.0%
5. India 4.1% 10. Indonesia
1.7%
The principal victim states are of three kinds: low-lying and other small island states; states with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas liable to floods, drought and desertification; and countries in the South with fragile mountainous ecosystems.
Low-lying states, in particular the Maldives, Marshall Islands, and Kiribati, stand to lose some of their atoll islands: the Maldives has estimated that sea-water protection would cost some 34% of its GDP. The major river delta states will be at risk: Bangladesh (from the Ganges); Brazil (Amazon); China (Yangste); Egypt (Nile); India (Ganges); Italy (Po); Nigeria (Niger); Pakistan (Indus); Vietnam (Mekong); and the United States (Mississippi). In one case, up to 15% of national territory is at risk. The recent disasters faced by the Netherlands and the US, the states most advanced in coastal and river protection, portends the kind of global problem that must be expected to challenge the national interest of states in the 21st century.
Arid and semi-arid states experience changes in temperature, wind and rainfall, causing agricultural migration at a pace faster than the adaptability threshold of many plant and crop species. There may be severe decline in productivity of the states in some regions, most notably Brazil in Latin America, most Sahel states in Africa, some CIS states in Central-West Asia, and the ASEAN states of Southeast Asia.
Mountainous fragile ecosystems in countries such as Nepal stand to experience more desiccated terrain and soil erosion on top of an already stressed national environment.
Some countries in the North will also be adversely affected. Vertical ecological zone shifts could harm biodiversity in France, Switzerland and Italy where the Alps are likely to develop a climate closer to that of the Pyrenees today. Agricultural crop migration could adversely affect the vast wheatfields of the United States.
Against this, it is possible that some countries could benefit in certain ways. A northward shift in the precipitation belts associated with the Intertropical Convergence Zone could benefit at least some Sahelian countries. A similar climatic zonal shift could benefit agriculture in polar-proximate countries, namely Canada, the Nordic countries, Russia and Japan in the northern hemisphere, and Argentina and Chile in the south. As yet, the precise effects are uncertain. If such a prognostication is confirmed, however, do these states have a "legitimate national interest" in accepting the onset of climate change, or does the planetary interest require that they vigorously combat it? In reality, most of these states are in the forefront of such efforts.
Identification of the "vital planetary interest" in the face of climate
change is clearly a challenging task. Three critical questions must
be asked:
1. What is the necessary strategic goal in the "vital planetary
interest"?
2. What are the "legitimate national interests" of States?
3. Are nation-states meeting their commitments to that end, i.e.
are they pursuing "legitimate national interests"?
In a general sense, it is agreed that climate stabilization is the overall
strategic goal. The "ultimate objective" specified in the 1992 Climate
Change Convention is the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system". Such a level should be achieved
within a time-frame sufficient to:
* allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change;
* ensure that food production is not threatened; and
* enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
What, however, does this mean in terms of practical action? The IPCC calculated "with confidence" that the long-lived greenhouse gases would require immediate reductions in emissions of over 60% to stabilize their concentrations at today's levels, while methane would require a 15-20% reduction. Some environmental experts maintain that, with a current atmospheric concentration of 750 Gigatonnes of carbon, the maximum threshold permissible for future climatic stability will be another 300 Gt. before the planet's climate becomes dangerously destabilized. At present, some net 6 Gt. are emitted annually, which would mean another 50 years of emissions at current rates. In this view, deep cuts will be necessary below 1990 levels in the interests of planetary safety. The 1988 Toronto Conference, attended by scientists and policy-makers, called for a 20% global cut from 1988 carbon emissions by 2005.
The Convention, in fact, falls well short of these postulated global
targets.
States Parties have assumed a legal commitment to protect the climate
system in accordance with their "common but differentiated responsibilities"
and respective capabilities. The North is obligated to take the lead
in combatting climate change and its adverse effects. Under the Convention,
the 37 developed or market-transition States shall pursue national policies
to mitigate climate change by limiting greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing
sinks and reservoirs. They are to inform other Parties of the national
policies they have adopted with the aim of returning to their 1990 levels
of greenhouse gas emissions by 2000.
Thus most of the "responsible states" have an identifiable commitment. To what extent has it been met? It is still early days, the Convention having come into force in March 1994. Of the 37 Annex I states (including the EU), 20 had ratified the Convention by then and thereby assumed the obligation to report on their national policies by September 1994. Several important states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Poland, Russia) ratified subsequent to March and did not face the September obligation. Of the 20 "obligated states", 15 states (comprising 41% of 1990 global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion) had reported within the required time. France, Hungary, Iceland, Portugal and the EU did not report in time.
The 15 reporting states provided information relating to all greenhouse
gas sources and sinks for the year 2000. Of the 14 that reported
comparable data, seven projected themselves to be below, and seven above,
1990 levels by 2000, for a combined 2000 figure that is projected to be
fractionally higher (0.5%) than combined 1990 levels. National details
are:
Projected Anthropogenic Emissions and Removals
of All Greenhouse Gases in 2000 AD
(CO2 equivalent in Gigagrams, using 1994 GWPs;
Time-horizon = 100 years)
Net Increases: 1990 2000 Net
Canada 504,542 558,757
54,215
Spain 222,908 276,523
53,615
Australia 596,414 635,414
38,662
Japan 1,132,650 1,153,336 20,686
Austria 74,600
81,886 7,286
Sweden 40,383
46,440 6,057
Norway 52,478
54,790 2,312
Net Decreases:
Switzerland 47,194
45,267 1,927
Denmark 69,165
63,621 5,544
New Zealand 59,764
52,041 7,723
Netherlands 219,690 206,463
13,227
Czech Republic 176,548 145,256
31,292
United States 5,473,271 5,440,225 33,046
United Kingdom 738,453 695,353
43,100
Total 9,408,494 9,455,372 46,974
_____________________
Source: UN Document A/AC.237/81
Thus, the strategic goal identified in the Convention is a threshold of "safe" greenhouse gas concentrations that do not threaten ecosystem adaptability, food security and sustainable development. The existing legal commitment to that end is a return by the countries of the North to 1990 GHG emission levels. To date, the reporting States indicate a combined attainment virtually at that level.
What can be said about the legitimacy of national interests and policies in this first round of reporting on the Climate Change Convention? Is it sufficient, in the planetary interest, that States emitting only 41% of global fossil fuel emissions have to date reported? Of those that have reported, is each doing enough in its national policies? For its part the UN Report concluded that "in due time, it will be possible to assess the achievement of the aim of returning emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 by comparing the inventory figures for those two years. At present, a comparison of CO2 projections for 2000 with inventories for 1990 would suggest a somewhat greater need for additional measures".
Thus, it might be concluded that, even in terms of the weak commitments contained in the Convention, many States are going beyond their "legitimate national interests" and thus are acting against the "vital planetary interest".
It will be a long time before the debate is properly settled. At the 11th Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in February 1995, the Alliance of Small Island States put forward a draft Protocol which would have each of the countries of the North cut national emissions by 20% by 2005. The South was divided over the proposal, fearing future controls on themselves. Malaysia, however, is supporting the AOSIS proposal. Leading the opposition to binding national controls are China, reflecting a national interest in domestic coal-fired development, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, each reflecting a national oil-exporting interest. As a result, the first Conference of the Parties in March 1995 only agreed in principle to proceed to binding commitments. In each case, is this a pursuit of a "legitimate national interest"? Are these positions in the planetary interest or not?
More broadly, it might be asked whether, for instance, the United States pursues a legitimate national interest in maintaining its current levels of fossil fuel consumption. Do Brazil, Cote d'Ivoire and Indonesia pursue legitimate national interests through their rates of net deforestation? To what extent is the principle of Joint Implementation, by which a developed country could justify continued high carbon emissions by assisting a developing country introduce clean technologies at less cost than its own conversion would entail, in the planetary interest?
C. Carrying Capacity
An issue that is commanding increasing attention at the global level concerns the postulated carrying capacity of the planet, involving primarily the relationship between population growth and consumption patterns around the world.
The "population explosion" is well known: a doubling of the world population within a generation, and a current net increase of some 90 million each year, over 90% of this in the South. So is the "poverty gap", with about 1.5 billion affluent people in the world, some 3.2 billion meeting basic human needs, and 1 billion living in absolute poverty that denies the potential of human dignity and self-fulfillment.
The combination of consumption patterns in the North and population growth in the South with rising income in certain states is straining the resources of the planet. The global fisheries catch has reached the limit of sustainability, some consumption of staple food commodities have begun to decline in global per capita terms, and environmental stress in such critical areas as water, fuelwood and deforestation has increased.
The relationship between population size, consumption levels, and environmental stress is a new subject for the international community, and the analysis is at a rudimentary stage. As noted above, global sustainable development may be seen as in the planetary interest but national sustainable development is often exceeded at present. How is the planetary interest to be identified and is it of a vital or simply a normative nature?
The planetary interest in sustainable development might be identified
as "an optimal relationship between global population size and global production
and consumption levels that meets the principle of global sustainable development".
To date, however, the international community has not recognized such
a nexus between population, consumption and the environment. In recent
decades, various UN meetings have addressed certain aspects of the problem,
most notably the conferences on the environment in 1972 and 1992, and the
those on population in 1974, 1984 and 1994. At Rio de Janeiro in
1992 and Cairo in 1994, an effort was made to link the problems of population
growth and environmental stress to the development challenge of the South.
Little was achieved in this respect: concessionary measures providing for
financial and technical assistance to the South, which may or may not materialize,
for cleaner technologies to facilitate their future sustainable development.
In the aftermath of these meetings, North and South continue to perceive the problem of future global strain on resources in fundamentally different ways, reflecting their different circumstances and interests. The North sees it overwhelmingly in terms of human numbers, maintaining the assumption that economic growth is intrinsically limitless provided technological breakthroughs continue to occur that can be applied to both finite and renewable planetary resources. The South perceives the problem in terms of a generally finite global resource potential whose utilization is severely skewed through excessive consumption on the part of the North and a restrictive global economy whose rules are geared against them.
A workable global consensus is needed over this problem, and it is only recently that work has begun to that end. Equal effort is needed towards the twin strategic goals of responsible population planning and responsible consumption levels, and they must be seen by states as genuinely interdependent. To date, however, the focus of world attention has been more on population than consumption. The strategic goal for population was clearly identified at Cairo: the attainment of the low population projection of 7.8 billion by 2050 (instead of the medium projection of 10.1 b. or the high of 12.5 b.). At Rio, no comparable quantifiable goal was identified for consumption levels, and no functional link between excessive consumption and environmental stress is operational for concerted international action. Indeed, the idea of doing anything other than witnessing a laissez-faire development of national consumption patterns, or actively encouraging its growth, has, hitherto, been alien to intergovernmental thinking.
Rio did succeed, however, in placing the issue of consumption on the international agenda for the first time, through several of the principles in the Declaration. Principle 5 requires that "all States shall co-operate in the essential task of eradicating poverty ... in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world"; and Principle 8 states that "States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies." Agenda 21 states that "all countries should strive to promote sustainable consumption patterns" and developed countries should take the lead in this respect. Governments should, inter alia, "identify balanced patterns of consumption world-wide which the Earth can support in the long term." Consideration should be given to the present concepts of economic growth and the need for new concepts of wealth and prosperity which allow higher standards of living through changed lifestyles and are "less dependent on the Earth's finite resources and more in harmony with the Earth's carrying capacity".
The UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) in June 1994 reaffirmed "the need to change those contemporary patterns of consumption and production which are detrimental to sustainable development." In the context of "differentiated responsibilities" in this field, developed countries "bear special responsibility and should take the lead by taking effective measures for change in their own countries." All countries "should derive immediate and long-term benefits from establishing and maintaining more sustainable consumption and production patterns." The Commission recommended measures to change consumption and production patterns, especially in the North, through, inter alia, energy conservation, renewable energy sources, making greater use of public transport, recycling waste and reducing the quantity of packaging. It held it to be of "crucial importance to change consumption patterns, as well as production patterns, in order to ensure that products and production processes with adverse and environmental effects disappear."
Similarly, the Cairo Declaration and Programme of Action of September
1994, is clear at least on the responsibility of nations; it has to do
with sustainability and the UN is becoming prescriptive and more assertive:
"To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life
for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns
of production and consumption, and promote appropriate demographic policies.
... No society has the right to pursue consumption and production patterns
which undermine the ability of other societies to develop in a sustainable
manner, now and in the future".
For its part, the Copenhagen Declaration of March 1995 noted that poverty has its origins in "political, legal, economic and social structures and cultural values that sustain inequalities". Its eradication will not be possible without changes in such political and economic structures in order, inter alia, to ensure equal access for all to resources, opportunities and public services.
In April 1995, the CSD considered the progress made since Rio in changing trends in global consumption patterns "with a view to assisting Governments in establishing national priorities", and adopted a work programme for future years. This will involve periodic long-term projections of the global economy with a time-horizon of 40 years, and analyze the implications of global consumption and production patterns, evaluate policy measures for change, and elicit "time-bound voluntary commitments" from Member States to make "measurable progress" towards sustainable development goals.
Thus the international community is slowly but inexorably becoming a global community, one in which global sustainable development requires that no nation-state exceed national sustainability, at least without providing recompense. This is a complex issue and will take time to be elaborated further, but its political implications are profound.
The developments are likely to raise some difficult issues, for example,
concerning the "legitimate national interest" of states, issues which have
not been substantively debated before in official forums:
* is it a "legitimate national interest" for the United States
to maintain
an energy consumption per capita at 26,000 lbs of coal-
equivalent annually, when Germans consume 13,000 lbs, Kenyans
440 lbs, and Ethiopians 55 lbs?
* is it a "legitimate national interest" for an Australian to
eat 800 kg.
of cereals annually per capita, when a citizen in each African
state consumes, on average, 130 lbs?
* is it a "legitimate national interest" for 27 million Canadians
to own more telephone connections
than the 2.8 billion citizens of
Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria combined?
* is it a "legitimate national interest" for a country to encourage
a higher population growth rate in
today's world (as Malaysia and Saudi Arabia do)?
Some of these issues suggest purely normative considerations of value-judgements and international humanitarianism. But if the combined global level of consumption is, in certain areas, approaching the finite carrying capacity of the Earth, then questions of national consumption levels leave the realm of the normative and enter the categorical; the "normative planetary interest" becomes the "vital planetary interest".
The day may come when, in the interests of global sustainable development, the global carrying capacity might be assessed, a per capita norm calculated from this for each citizen of the planet, and tolerance limits established as prescriptive political goals within which national averages for certain consumption items are acknowledged as desirable.
There is a need for an index that relates population and consumption patterns into one measure that relates to environmental stress and, by implication, carrying capacity. Recently an index has been developed for the purpose. A formula has been devised that results in a "Consumption-Adjusted Population" statistic (CAP), which relates a country's energy use to its population size, thereby allowing a ranking of countries in terms of their national toll on the planet's resources.
A country's "planetary environmental stress" is expressed in D-units which is an energy-unit linking both the national physiological energy consumption with national technological energy consumption. The ranking of the "top ten" countries (by D-Units; see Note) is set out in the table below.
Planetary Environmental Stress: National Ranking
Rank Country Population % D-index D-units
(million) (million)
1. USA 262.5 4.6% 91.26
24,218
2. China 1,233.9 21.5% 7.19
10,106
3. Russia 149.7 2.6% 57.31
8,729
4. Japan 125.8 2.2%
37.75 4,875
5. Germany 81.2 1.4%
52.15 4,316
6. India 926.6 16.2%
3.58 4,244
7. Canada 28.4 0.5% 118.11
3,383
8. UK 58.1 1.0% 44.36
2,635
9. France 57.7 1.0%
44.13 2,604
10. Brazil 160.7 2.8% 14.00
2,411
WORLD 5,734.9
----------------
Note: The table is based on formulae used in the paper "Consumption:
The Other Side of Population for Development", prepared in 1994 for ICPD,
by Mata F.J., Onisto, L.J., & Valentyne, J.R., [p.3]. The
D-index in the Paper is used here (based on 1989 technological energy figures).
The population figures are updated, taken as at 31 March 1995 (source:
UNFPA Electronic Continuous Population Monitor). The D-Index for
USSR (1989) is taken for Russia; that for Germany is weighted between FRG
and GDR.
The D-Unit = Population x (D-Index + 1).
An analysis of the CAP-Index clarifies the issue: that, for human sustainability
on a resource-finite planet, what is needed in the planetary interest is,
in the words of Sir Shridath Ramphal, "rolling back consumption levels
in the North and reducing population growth in the South". Both politically
and in terms of the statistical methodology, it is too early to advance
hypotheses concerning the "legitimate national interests" of each country
based on the above table. Yet such work is an important harbinger
of future statistical analysis and political judgement.
CONCLUSION
The planetary interest is a new, and abstract, concept. It is, at the present moment, distanced from the realm of practical politics where the natural competing tensions among states pursuing their national interests will always be vigorously played out. Relating the planetary interest to the legitimate national interests of states reveals all the complexities of the real world, whether pursued in global negotiations or in unilateral policies on global issues.
Because of the complexities, the concept cannot be used in any formal context, such as binding commitments in legal instruments. It does, however, have potential as a political concept for guiding policy debate among nation-states on global issues, as the national interest guides national decision-making; and also as a prescriptive norm for judging individual behavior.
The "planetary interest" will act as a tool in helping to find answers to the vexing and difficult global problems -- it is not the answer itself. There will be as many individual opinions of what the planetary interest is on any single global issue as there are individuals making the judgement -- potentially 5.7 billion different individual judgements. The same holds for the national interest: the debate over US intervention in Haiti or US reliance on and commitment to UN peacekeeping reveals potentially 262 million individual views of the US national interest. Yet the concept of the national interest itself is never questioned.
It is a sign of the stage we are at as a species that the planetary interest is now only beginning to be developed as a concept for political consideration. It is applicable to many issues affecting the planet. Where does the planetary interest lie in nuclear testing and where is China's legitimate national interest in this respect? What are the legitimate national interests of the US and Russia with regard to strategic force reductions and ultimate force levels? Egypt and Israel's dispute over the extension of the NPT? Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's different population policies? Canada's unlawful seizure of the Spanish vessel in the name of preserving regional and, by extension, global fishery stocks? Iceland's departure from the International Whaling Commission in the name of a vital national interest? The list goes on. So long as nation-states compete and conflict in the name of the national interest, the need will exist for an objective conceptual criterion that transcends the national interest and helps to arbitrate in the name of the planet and the species. So long as we face issues affecting the planet, there will be a need to develop the concept of the planetary interest. More work to develop it further needs to be done. But with the passage of time, the concept will come to be validated.