Names and Pseudonyms
By Mussie Msghina  December 1, 1999

 A name, although by no means a unique identifier, is a label that for all practical purposes establishes identity of a person. People are given a name at birth, proudly wear it throughout life, and except for con artists die with it when their time comes. Similarly, a name, with equally acceptable certainty, establishes identity of a place whether it is called Badme, Zalambessa or Paris. 

It would be a logistical nightmare - besides being symptomatic of hidden maladies - if people and places were to keep changing names. But this is what is often happening in today's Ethiopia. 

 In what is reminiscent of the Bolshevik tradition, not a single politburo member in Ethiopia's ruling party – the Marxist Leninist League of Tigrai - is known by his proper name. Imitating Lenin and Stalin, all go under self-acquired pseudonyms. The same goes for the Ethiopian army, except that here the pseudonyms though less creative are more funnier. Not long ago, one could read in the electronic version of BBC's Focus on Africa, as well as the Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter,  the story of two Ethiopian officers - a "war hero" and an aspiring "war hero" - who wouldn't reveal their names but insisted on being called Colonel "X" and Colonel "Y". The absurdly funny reason Colonel "X" gave to the journalists who wondered about his strange behavior was, "The Eritreans know me very well, they know how I think and how I shoot. That is why I don't want to reveal my identity". We were not told what Colonel "Y's" reasons were, but whatever these were one can imagine the mischievous smile on the face of the journalists upon hearing it. 

 With equal viciousness, pseudonyms and multiple aliases rule the day in the Ethiopian corner of cyberspace. To their credit, the cyber-warriors are more  creative than both the army and the political elite and as a rule have more dramatic sounding colorful pseudonyms. Thus, in the official Ethiopian website called Walta people routinely misidentify themselves using pseudonyms from bygone eras. This strange behavior is a clear indicator of an irrational streak of mind in the three cornerstones of Ethiopian "democracy" - the ruling elite, the army, and the cyber activists. 

  This in normal terms inexplicable infatuation with pseudonyms has as yet not received proper attention. Without doubt, there is enough material here for more  than one Ph.D. theses on any appropriate subject of psychology or psychiatry. However, more disturbing is the fact that this has in more than subtle ways made the peace negotiations difficult. An example at hand is the case of "Badme", the very word itself. Many thought Badme was the name of a small town on the Eritrean side of the international boundary. But to the detriment of the peace process, Eritrea and the rest of the world learned some 8 or 10 months into the peace negotiations that "Badme" is Ethiopia's pseudonym for the entire border area, including Zalambessa, Alitena, and Burre; places that are hundreds of miles away, and in many cases much bigger than Badme. Eritrea went along with this after the OAU, acquiescing to Ethiopian pressure, said that by "Badme and surrounding" they also meant the entire border area. 

This obsessive infatuation is not limited to proper names only. Even words that denote concepts or notions like peace, cease-fire, aggression, and etc. have fallen victim and are given aliases and pseudonyms. Ethiopia's code word for peace seems to be the ill-defined notion of "return to status quo ante"; a ploy meant to give it sovereignty over the disputed areas prior to any form of investigation or demarcation. The code-idiom for its plan to overthrow the Eritrean government is "aggression must be reversed". Or as the Ethiopian Prime Minister spelled it a bit more during a recent interview, "Eritrea has to face the consequences of aggression". 

 Unless one has a healthy respect for the proper names given to oneself and others, unless one abides by the common usage of the name of places, rivers, concepts and notions, how is one to be a credible partner in an already difficult peace negotiations. As a matter of fact, Ethiopia's problem start right with the first hand shake:Ethiopian Prime Minister  Meles Zenawi cannot look US Presidential Advisor Anthony Lake straight in the eye and say his name is Meles, neither can the foreign minister do the same and say Seyoum is his name. Both "Meles" and " Seyoum" are adopted "nomes de guerre" . 

 Eritrea should stop playing along this absurd game. It could set the records straight by making available a list of the proper names of Ethiopia's current rulers, starting with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. A list could also be made available of the proper names of places and rivers, correct the ones that have been cloned and re-baptized by the TPLF, and see if agreement can be reached on the others. This may seem an exercise in futility, but exposing this irrational behavior may help people outside our region understand more easily what Ethiopia means when it says "peace", "status quo ante", "aggression must not be rewarded", "Eritrea must face the consequence of aggression" and other re-baptized concepts and code-idioms. One thing is for sure though, whatever the hidden significance of this absurd and uniquely irrational behavior may be, any talk of democracy while espousing such thoroughly Bolshevik traditions is nothing but deceitful. Unless of course Ethiopia's democracy is based on Bolshevik traditions.
 

 

Why does Ethiopia equate peace with defeat?
                By Mussie Msghina, November 7, 1999

Conclusion

The TPLF has impressive track records in generating conflicts, but a dismal one when its comes to the peaceful resolution of these. This is more than amply demonstrated by its current behavior and the way it is handling the international peace efforts. By now it should be clear to everyone that the TPLF views a peaceful resolution of the current conflict as tantamount to defeat. For Eritrea, and the people of Ethiopia, ultimate victory lies in achieving a lasting peace through a clear cut demarcation of the border, one that leaves little room for confusion and future conflicts. For the TPLF, on the other hand, peace would mean that it will have to abandon its Greater Tigrai agenda. And a clear cut demarcation of the border would leave little room for foul play, without which it cannot attain its stated objectives of overthrowing the Eritrean government and teaching Eritrea a lesson. An intact Eritrea, the object of TPLF's virulent resentment, has almost become a symbol of defeat for TPLF leaders. Furthermore, peace would unavoidably mean that the TPLF will have to deal with auditors representing the Ethiopian people, and come clean and account for the enormous loss of life that its human-wave strategy has entailed. 
Therefore, if the international peace efforts are to succeed the facilitators have to understand why the TPLF is doing all it can to avoid signing the peace accords. They should take into account the above factors so as not to be deceived by TPLF’s attempts to frustrate the peace efforts without appearing to do so. 
 

 
Is the TPLF regressing back to its Leninist roots?
                                    By Mussie Msghina - October 10, 1999

It is said that when people get confused they regress to earlier stages in their development. The same seems to apply to organizations as well. As a matter of fact this is happening right before our eyes to Ethiopia's ruling clique -- the Tigrai People's Liberation Front (TPLF). From Ethiopia's recent incoherent anti-West tirade one would think that this is the 60s all over again and that Enver Hoxsha is firmly saddled in Tirana and kindred spirits in Mekele and Addis Abeba. 
What has set the tone for this new anti-West campaign is Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin's infamous "How-the-world- underdeveloped-Ethiopia" speech at the UN. And all of a sudden, as if dams have been opened, anti-West political vocabularies (colonialist, neo-colonialist, etc.) that were once thought to have undergone extinction are making ferocious comeback in the Ethiopian political life. 
In his speech at the UN, the Ethiopian foreign minister told the world that his country feels hurt and insecure because the UN security council would not condone and subsidize its war of aggression. Taking their cue from this, wild conspiracy theories implicating now the IMF, now the World Bank, now the US and now the UN abound in Ethiopia's printed and electronic media. First it was western journalists who were the major culprits, now it is World Bank and IMF functionaries who are claimed to be at the forefront of this world wide anti-Ethiopia conspiracy that an increasingly erratic TPLF is concocting. 

What is going on here? Is the TPLF finally going back to its Albania inspired Leninist roots? Or is it simply trying to appear doing so to blackmail the West? In either case, and especially in the light of this interesting new development of an Ethiopia-North Korea axis, the TPLF has firmly set Ethiopia on course to joining the select club of rogue states. 
Rehabilitating Dergue-era war criminals, reinstating them into the army, buying weapons and mercenaries from the reclusive North Korea that, to make matters worse, has given refuge to the arch-dictator Mengistu. The TPLF is full of surprises! One only wonders what more is in store. And who in her right mind would get surprised if he or she was to read tomorrow that the TPLF has rehabilitated Mengistu and hired him to broker further arms deals with North Korea using his excellent connections in the hermit state! 

Major irrational streaks in the TPLF modus operandi --- Ethnicism 

It seems it only takes few properly applied scratches here and there to expose thinly veiled irrational streaks in the TPLF cast of mind. The obsessive resentment the TPLF harbors for Eritrea, and whose ferocity really took the world by surprise, was unmasked in the first weeks of the conflict by battle ground scratches in Badme, Burre and Zalambesa. Confused by the foiling of its invasion plans, the TPLF sought and found refuge in ethnicism - a well proved and favorite TPLF weapon with which it had already plagued Ethiopia dividing it into ethnic enclaves. 
Spearheaded by Meles Zenawi's infamous "if we don't like the color of their eyes we have the right to deport" policy formulation, the TPLF ethnicized a relatively uncomplicated border dispute and unleashed a loot and deport campaign of terror against Ethiopians of Eritrean origin and Eritreans residing in Ethiopia, in the process victimizing more than 60 000 people who had absolutely nothing to do with how borders in Badme or Zalambesa run.

Leninism

And more recently, press room scratches at the corridors of the IMF and World Bank (a feed-your-people-first scratch, soon followed by a no-peace-no-money scratch) have exposed other major irrational streaks in TPLF’s world view. Confused by the IMF’s refusal to subsidize their war of aggression, TPLF's Albania admiring cadres have brought back to life communist era anti-West chatter, and seem now busy trying to rally the forces of yesteryear - North Korea and other friends of Lenin - by incessantly drumming up anti-US and anti-UN resentment in their official and semi-official media. 
Another famous, and partly Lenin inspired, pet hypothesis of the 60s they have resurrected is the claim that the world is responsible for Ethiopia's predicament and underdevelopment (the "How-the-west -underdeveloped-Ethiopia" argument). 
In support of this hypothesis, the list of the anti-Ethiopia conspiracies they contrive grows by the day: there is, as mentioned above, the super conspiracy to underdevelop Ethiopia, there is the conspiracy to humiliate Ethiopia at the hands of Eritrea, there is the conspiracy to hold back Ethiopia from assuming its rightful super powerial role, the list goes on. Only Djibouti, and probably now North Korea, are considered allies and spared from this generalized anti-world tantrum. 
What makes all this uniquely weird is that this confrontational chatter is simply because the world has told Ethiopia to accept peace accords that Eritrea already accepted and signed. And what makes it even more weirder is that the tantrum is coming at a time when Africa has resolutely opted for a partnership in development with the west and the rest of the world. 
 

 
        Why does Ethiopia equate peace with defeat?
                            By Mussie Msghina, November 7, 1999

A cursory glance at the recent history of the region shows that since its inception in 1974 the TPLF has been excessively conflict prone, often enmeshed in conflicts of its making. Unique among all the actors in the region, it is the only organization that has come to blows with almost every armed group that was in existence in Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1974 and the present. In Eritrea, it fought both liberation fronts. In Ethiopia, it fought pan-Ethiopian as well as separatist forces. In the ethnic arena, it fought representatives of the Oromo, Amhara, Sidama and Ogaden people. In the ideological arena, it fought both moderates and leftists. The few groups it didn’t fight are the ones that it itself created. 
Has the TPLF resolved any of its conflict peacefully?

Although a typical TPLF conflict follows certain patterns - for example, it seldom entails a peaceful resolution and almost always entails the creation of alternative forces to replace its opponents - the causes shift with who the opponent happens to be. With Eritrean forces, it is a noxious combination of resentment and expansionist agenda that gets it in trouble. With forces representing nationalities within Ethiopia - and more recently also Somali factions - it is its view of itself as a regional power. With pan-Ethiopian forces, it is its ethnicist nature. With moderate forces, it was its unbending extreme-left ideology. With leftist forces, it was its view of itself as a revolutionary vanguard. In some extreme cases, as in its conflict with the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), it was a combination of many of the above. 
It is undeniable that conflicts make up a big part of TPLF’s biography, and no other group in the region can remotely match its impressive records in these matters. It is said you can tell who people are by the company they keep. With the TPLF, it is its conflicts that are most revealing. Here are few examples, and I am sure others can easily add more to these: 
Hegemonist: From the beginning, the TPLF saw Tigrai as its fiefdom and wouldn’t allow the existence of other liberation movements there. Early on, it dealt a fatal blow to a budding liberation movement in Tigrai (TLF). Two other groups, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) that also tried to set bases in Tigrai met similar fates. 

Expansionist: Its Greater Tigrai agenda, which claims huge chunks of land from Eritrea, twice got it in trouble with Eritrea. First in the late 70s, with the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). And now its current conflict with Eritrea, which it is refusing to resolve peacefully despite extensive international efforts. Furthermore, although it has until now gone militarily unchallenged, it has in accordance with its Greater Tigrai agenda moved by decree large parts of two Ethiopian provinces, Wollo and Begemdr, into its ethnic enclave Tigrai. 

Ideology: The TPLF’s Leninist ideology got it in conflict with moderate forces like the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU). The TPLF finished in Tigrai what Mengistu started in Addis Abeba - the war against the ancient regime and the moderate forces that were loyal to it. 

Vanguardism: The TPLF long claimed to be the only true revolutionary party in the Horn of Africa. Outside the Horn, only Albania was accepted as equally pure. Needless to say, this caused numerous conflicts. For example, this was one of the reasons behind its conflict with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP). Similarly, under this pretext it unleashed a vicious war of words against the EPLF in the mid-80s. 
Ethnicism: The TPLF started its career strictly as a Tigrai nationalist movement, with aspirations limited only to the liberation of Tigrai and the creation of an Albania style People’s Republic there. Because of its ethnicist nature, it came early on in conflict with groups like the EPRP that aspired to be pan-Ethiopian movements. And more recently, after its coming to power in Ethiopia it divided the country into ethnic enclaves, a move that has brought it into conflict with, among others, the all Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO). 
Big power megalomania: As absurd and crazy as it sounds, the TPLF views itself as a regional super power with the license to determine the politics of the Greater Horn. Its repeated forays into Kenya in pursuit of Oromo nationalists, its invasion of Somalia, its politics of intimidation vis á vis Djibouti, its invasion attempts in Eritrea, all these have a lot to do with its super power pretensions.

Conclusion

The TPLF has impressive track records in generating conflicts, but a dismal one when its comes to the peaceful resolution of these. This is more than amply demonstrated by its current behavior and the way it is handling the international peace efforts. By now it should be clear to everyone that the TPLF views a peaceful resolution of the current conflict as tantamount to defeat. For Eritrea, and the people of Ethiopia, ultimate victory lies in achieving a lasting peace through a clear cut demarcation of the border, one that leaves little room for confusion and future conflicts. For the TPLF, on the other hand, peace would mean that it will have to abandon its Greater Tigrai agenda. And a clear cut demarcation of the border would leave little room for foul play, without which it cannot attain its stated objectives of overthrowing the Eritrean government and teaching Eritrea a lesson. An intact Eritrea, the object of TPLF's virulent resentment, has almost become a symbol of defeat for TPLF leaders. Furthermore, peace would unavoidably mean that the TPLF will have to deal with auditors representing the Ethiopian people, and come clean and account for the enormous loss of life that its human-wave strategy has entailed. 
Therefore, if the international peace efforts are to succeed the facilitators have to understand why the TPLF is doing all it can to avoid signing the peace accords. They should take into account the above factors so as not to be deceived by TPLF’s attempts to frustrate the peace efforts without appearing to do so. 

Real politics and Wag Shum Gobeze
           Mussie Msghina September 15, 1999

Dear Medhane Tadesse, 
I have to admit, reading your article felt a bit strange at first. Your ideas didn't immediately sound that crazy to me. They did, of course, a minute or so later, but not right away. How can that be, I wondered. How can ideas that are so wrong not feel that wrong. And then it hit me. Of course,...it is the time factor. If only this was the 19th century! 
You would feel right at home in the last century, and make an excellent adviser to Dejatch Wubi or Wag Shum Gobezi. Paired with anyone of these, and armed with your then 'novel' notion of assertive real politics, you could have turned Lasta into a great nation state. Could even have won a seat for the Wag Shum at the Berlin conference and the partitioning of Africa. It wouldn't be fair to your neighbors, but you wouldn't bother about such flimsy 20th century ideas like justice, rights and conventions, the common good, etc. Would you? 

What I don't understand is why you want to give such a high-tech name to your 19th century ideas. True, in our fast moving world even the notion of real politics is woefully outdated, but still. We have a saying in Tigrigna, "Bgze Wubi ztsememes, Wubi Wubi kbl mote" Rendered into English, "No era is like Wube's era to one who goes nuts under Wubi". As interesting as the past is, and believe me I too am interested, a historian is supposed to study it, not altogether move there for good. Thanks, anyway, for confirming my suspicions that the Wubi era still reigns in Woyane's Ethiopia. 

As far as the current conflict is concerned, your advice is a recipe for disaster, unless, of course, you're looking for an African World War I. In fact as a historian you should know that your ideas have already been tried in the Europe of the world wars. A resentful Germany, feeling that it has been snubbed by its neighbors, and wanting to flex its muscles to massage a wounded national ego twice ignited a fire that was to consume more than 30 million lives. That was then, at least as far as Europe is concerned. What about now? Now a reconstructed Western Europe has outlawed war and 'real politics' in its midst. It understood, as you should understand, that rational politics can not have as its goals the massaging of a wounded national ego, the bolstering of a weak self image, or the settling of scores for past defeats. 

I have also, with some amusement, noted your penchant for terminology and symbolism that are alien to our conditions, both yours and ours. But then, if you want to play that game why not go all the way. Now that we have had our first world war (May-June 1998) and second world war (Feb-March 1999), why not call a truce and officially declare a Cold War between our two countries. We can have our own Ping-Pong diplomacy, or better still, have our leaders meet in Helsinki, kiss, sign a Helsinki Declaration, and pompously inaugurate an Ethio-Eritrean Ditente. What do you say? 

Look, let me not waste more of your time with more of this. To bolster my case, I could have raised moral issues, human rights aspects, the question of justice, of fairness. Things that, in your eagerness to sound all that, you would probably simply dismiss as irrelevant. But, believe me, from the level of sophistication you already display here, your best bet is to stick to the rules and forget this talk about real politics. Besides, you would be using the wrong manual to solve problems between two brotherly peoples, problems that are more easily solved with a little touch of rational thinking, without resentment, and without unrealistic notions of greatness. 

As a historian who finds himself at the doors of a new millennium, forget this Wag Shum style real politicking, and advise whoever it is that listens to you that peace is the best option; to let both our peoples march in peace towards the new century, and new millennium. 

Brotherly 
Mussie Msghina 

* Wag Shum Gobezi and Dejatch Wubi are potentates from 19th century Abyssinia, and masters of abyssinian style real politicking. 
 
 

Real Politick - Ethiopia's version
      Mussie Msghina September 5, 1999

In a lengthy interview with "The Reporter" - a mouthpiece of the ruling Marxist Leninist League of Tigrai (MLLT) - Medhane Tadesse, a foreign relations expert of the MLLT, had this to say about the current conflict, "The expectation that the Eritrean regime could collapse in a short period of time is not there. The regime [Eritrean] has managed to continue fighting and to offer a strong resistance, which is something I did not expect". Regarding the peace process and the US role in this, this is what he had to say, "I believe this whole diplomatic mess came as a result of the fact that the US is determined to save Eritrea". 

If the MLLT cadres miscalculated in thinking that Eritrea would quickly collapse under the pressure of an invading Ethiopian army, the pressure of economic boycott, and the pressure of aerial and naval embargo imposed by the Ethiopian air force, what do they do now that they openly admit this calculation proved to be a gross miscalculation? Secondly, what was it they had in mind that Eritrea needed to be saved from this by US diplomatic intervention? 

Ethiopia's options

The answer to these questions are hinted by the same Medhane Tadesse. This is what he says regarding Ethiopia's options, "I expect Ethiopia to offer a tough resistance to the pressure from the US. As a result of this, I don't think the peace process will last, while the military option is still there", and a short while later adds, "Ethiopia will continue to play real politics in the sub-region, unlike in the past". 

The military option is Ethiopia's best option, according to Medhane Tadesse, but what more does his "real politick" entail besides outright military aggression? Real politick is a term coined by cold war strategists during the Nixon-Breszjnev era of containment by mutual appeasement. In short, what it meant was that the two super powers have "legitimate" interest that may not be supported, or may even go counter to international conventions. To protect these interests, they accorded each other the right to conduct a diplomacy of power and coercion as opposed to the diplomacy of rights and convention, and on the basis of this defined spheres of interest & influence at the expense of the Poles, East Germans, Latin Americans, Africans and others. 

What is Ethiopia's version of real politick?

In the beginning of the conflict, as is typical of aggressors, Ethiopia showed the world only its legitimate cards. Taking this at face value, peace brokers worked out a deal that to almost 100% satisfied Ethiopia's demands. Strangely, this put Ethiopia in a dilemma, or in a "whole lot of diplomatic mess" according to Medhane Tadesse, because the gratification of these demands was not all Ethiopia had in mind. The next step, in the Ethiopian version of real politick, is therefore to try to conduct a diplomacy of coercion and come up with demands that run counter to international conventions -- gunboat diplomacy, but better called human wave diplomacy in the case of Ethiopia. In short, Ethiopia, as the big power that it believes itself to be, plans to play its illegitimate cards, and present its illegitimate demands, hoping that it will have the muscle to get away with this, or at least win US understanding for this. This is what Medhane Tadesse had in mind by real politics, and if anything the recent OAU clarification is an indicator of this. From the OAU's reply to Ethiopia's queries, it is obvious that Ethiopia unsuccessfully tried to bypass the international treaties and conventions that established Africa's colonial borders as the basis for the resolution of this conflict. 

The problems with this strategy are of course quite obvious. For starters, only few countries have the military power, economic clout and political sophistication to bend rules and muscle their way to unfair concessions. The US, may be,.... but Ethiopia?.... Hardly. The US can, as Carter did in late 70s, unilaterally classify oil as a strategic commodity, and declare that it will not tolerate any interruption of its flow from the wells of Arabia to the machines of the industrial West. It can, as Reagan did in the 80s, unilaterally declare Uranium, Plutonium, etc. to be strategic metals, and warn "strategic metal" producing countries of the consequences if delivery was to be interrupted. 

Is Ethiopia in the same league? Not by a long shot. Ethiopia is a big power only as far as vanity is concerned, while in reality it is a country that has to beg for its daily bread, and wouldn't even count as a paper tiger. One cannot conduct real politics by threatening the world, "unless I get my way I will let five million of my people starve to death. Or, unless I get my way I will send wave after wave of my young conscripts to a sure death". No, the best option for weak countries like Ethiopia, or small countries like Eritrea, is not to play real politics but to scrupulously follow the rules. Just because it signed treaties and conventions with the likes of Italy in the previous century, Ethiopia seems to think it plays in the same division as these. And as long as it insists on this, Ethiopia, like Mussolini's Italy, will be condemned to a rhetoric and theatrical gestures that do not match its reality, something that at times can get quite funny if it were not for the inherent tragedy in the whole of it. 

Prospects for peace

And now, as predicted by Medhane Tadesse, and recommended by a cheering crowd of like minded pseudo intellectuals, Ethiopia has officially rejected the OAU peace proposals. This effectively brings to an end that phase of the negotiations where both parties talked about rights and conventions. After months of lies and deception, a helplessly cornered Ethiopia has lost this phase of the negotiations and for all practical purposes conceded the moral high ground to Eritrea. For its part, Eritrea will continue to talk rights and conventions, and insist on these being the only basis for the resolution of the conflict. If Ethiopia can be convinced by the world community to remain within the sphere of legitimate interest and legitimate demands, then peace will still remain a possibility. If, on the other hand, it insists on taking us to the next phase, to what it calls real politics, then the world better brace itself because we are in for a long haul. 

Ethiopia's hidden agenda

Throughout this whole conflict, Ethiopia's negotiating style has been unabashedly maximalist. But as infantile as this is, it has not been the funniest part. Even funnier is this, Ethiopia demanded the nearly impossible, got all its demands met, but to the bafflement of the peace brokers rejects the very peace proposals that were based wholly on its demands. Here, it should be clear to the world that Ethiopia is rejecting the peace proposals not to amuse us, but for one and one reason only: the peace proposals are rejected because they do not satisfy its hidden agenda-to annex Eritrean territory, including Assab, and to overthrow the current government in Eritrea and install a puppet regime that will do its bidding. 
This is truly a fiasco for Ethiopia, and the blaming game has already started. Ultra right chauvinists are blaming Meles Zenawi for not letting the world know about the existence of Ethiopia's hidden agenda as early as Feb. 1999 -- around the time of the recapture of Badme. The argument goes like this: in the beginning Meles was right to deceive the world and deny the existence of the hidden agenda. But starting from Feb. 1999, he should have gradually introduced the world to this. For his part, by rejecting the peace proposals, Meles seems to agree with this criticism. Here, what both Meles and his critics are forgetting is that in this day and age the diplomacy of lies and deception is nether rational nor profitable, and history will not be kind to them for this. 

In any case, now that Ethiopia's hidden agenda is fully exposed, the world community should make it clear to Ethiopia, as it made it clear to Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Milosovich's Serbia, that the age of conquest and expansion is over, and that it will not allow Ethiopia to continue its war of aggression. 
 

 

Teaching an old fox new tricks: teaching the Woyane honesty 

Mussie Msghina September 3, 1999 

The Swedish criminal justice system, which is widely known for its liberalism, goes to a great length to teach trust to hardened criminals. Although success rate is low and relapse high, as part of their rehabilitation criminals are taught the benefits of trusting as well as that of honesty. Eritrea cannot be trusted, says Ethiopia. This coming from the Woyane is not surprising - hardened criminals are hardly trusting. It is also too bad that the criminal justice system in Eritrea is not that liberal that it would spend valuable resources teaching criminals something they should have learned as kids. Eritrea can only teach by being an example. Besides, it is too busy teaching them other valuable lessons. 

In any case, to their credit, the Woyane make a rich and fascinating research material for moral philosophers interested in dishonesty, and could teach these one or two things about lying. After the end of this conflict, I expect a bonanza for sociologists and moral philosophers interested in these fields. Call it a peace dividend if you like. The Harvard sociologist, Sissela Bok, in her short essay, "Lying", describes different types of lies. Some lies come with an inbuilt escape plan. Lies of omission, for example, allow a 'lapse of memory' type of defense. Other lies, in the absence of witnesses or recorded material, afford skilled liars a "he said, she said", or "I didn't do it, he did" line of escape. 
In another book, Jean Paul Sartre talks at great length about three types of lies - lying to oneself (bad faith), lying to a second person who is a direct witness (Tlmet), and lying to third parties (as a rule quite difficult to pin down, that is until recently). Then there is the classical Freudian example of the liar who when accused of breaking a kettle that he borrowed from his neighbor defends himself by saying, "First of all, I did not break your stupid kettle, it was already broken when you gave it to me last week. Secondly, it was all in one piece when I returned it yesterday. And besides, I never borrowed it in the first place anyway, so what is the fuss!" A complicated line of defense! 

The present conflict has made it clear that the repertoire of Woyane lies is much richer than that catalogued by social scientists. If one is allowed to say it, for me their lies have been the lighter side of this whole tragic episode. I could never have imagined that there were people capable of this. My favorite Woyane lie is Solomie going publicly on the record denying a video clipping of a burning Ethiopian helicopter, claiming that the footage is nothing but a figment of Eritrea's imagination. Of this, a wisecracking Eritrean commented, "The world will say now, oh! this Eritreans must really be something that they can capture their imagination on video". Another favorite woyane lie is Syum Mesfin's fabrication of the Adigrat bombing, and his reply, "How can I know, I was not there" when asked if any bombs fell during the alleged bombing. Another one is the stale bread at Geza Gerehelasie story that drew a heartily laughter from Yemane G/Meskel on BBC, and was exposed by an incredulous Italian journalist. 

And now, a fabrication of a battle in Zalambessa. Journalists should ask Solomie and Syum Mesfin if there were any bullets fired during this 9 hour long battle. Luckily for us, though, the woyane come a century or so late in this. In our day and age, it is not that easy to get away with the kind of lies that Alula Aba-Nega used to get away in the last century. Nowadays, it doesn't take months or years but hours before a lie is exposed. Of course, it is another matter what the world does with it once a lie is exposed. 

On another related matter too, the Woyane come a century or so late. The time when one could redraw maps and adjust borders to gratify greed is a thing of the past. The age of conquest and expansion is over. Even animals mark their territory by peeing around them, and, if we are to trust BBC documentaries, neighboring animals respect this demarcation. Anyway, among humans, nowadays, if somebody wants to conquer something it better be greed, ignorance or a suspicious nature. Things that the Woyane have in abundance. Can the Woyane foxes be taught to give up their old tricks and learn modern "tricks" like honesty and truthfulness, that in the longer perspective these are better policy than the best of lies. Or is it that the Woyane are our neighbors only in space, and not in time?