Vad säger etiopier
om konflikten?
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By Prof. Habtamu Bihonilign August 21, 1999
In a recent telephone conversation with a trusted friend whose informed opinion I highly value the issue of the on-going efforts at securing peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea came up. My friend, out of character from his usually subdued, reflective, and academic responses let his disappointment all hung out. He encapsulated his reaction, borne of growing disappointment and disillusionment, by simply saying, "The TPLF? Peace?...and I have a bridge to sell you in Brooklyn!" That statement has grabbed me by the collar and forced me to take a serious look at what has transpired since June 13, 1998, a date, to use F. D. Roosevelt's famous line, which will live in infamy. We have all been grappling with what went wrong and where ever since this calamitous situation has been visited upon our peoples. With each new and important piece of information that I come across, my views have undergone gradual but definite metamorphosis. This is especially true with regard to the most recent development that seemed to have finally given this seemingly hopeless situation a glimmer of hope. I keep asking myself, "Will peace be finally achieved now?" Before its demise is announced officially, let me break it to you. I am afraid peace has eluded us once again. Once the early frenzied war hysteria the TPLF regime let loose in Ethiopia fifteen months ago subsided, and the inevitable reality of war threw cold water in the face of a seemingly sleep walking nation, peace has now become the most priceless commodity Ethiopians wish more than anything else. The war with Eritrea has compounded the already difficult life they have led in my own lifetime. Alas, Ethiopians have come to realize that the very survival of Ethiopia as a unified country hinges on peace. Oddly enough, for the minority regime that has ruled Ethiopia with iron-fist, deception and terror, 'peace' has come to represent the most dreaded sort of thing it has ever faced in the past eight years. It knows not what to do with it. There should be no surprise here for the rulers and the ruled have never really marched in lockstep. All the charade about the TPLF regime's acceptance of the OAU Framework Agreement and the subsequent Modalities for the Implementation of the Agreement aside, one point is clear. And that is, every step those who claim to represent Ethiopia have taken since the beginning of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea can only lead any thinking human being to one, and only one conclusion. Peace is not in their interest. They have nothing to gain by it, and everything to loose. Today more than ever, the regime finds itself in the least tenable situation - a catch-22 syndrome, if you will. I say this because, having weighed everything that has gone on to date, I could find no credible reason why the TPLF would opt for peace. In the natural order of things where the instinctive thing to do is circling the wagon, I realize that many of my conclusions about the present state of affairs in Ethiopia might not be so popular. It is bound to rub many a soul the wrong way. Encouraged by the official media, misplaced patriotism and nationalism is what is in vogue. But, it is high time that somebody stands up and shouts, "the king has no clothes on." Why do I believe Meles & company doesn't have any stake in peace? The following are some of my reasons. The TPLF has already told Ethiopians too many lies: it can't face the light of day now.Fifteen months after the outbreak of the conflict we now know that the war has very little to do with disputes associated with any border. Badme was only a stalking-horse, a ruse. The fundamental problem between the TPLF and Eritrea is the former's as yet fully unrealized ambition of carving out Greater Tigrai at the expense of Eritrea and the people of the rest of Ethiopia. The Woyane regime did "achieve" the first phase of its long-held dream of Greater Tigrai at the time it recklessly Balkanized Ethiopia into a patchwork of Ethnic cantons, radically changing the administrative configuration of the nation. In the process, this minority regime was able to carve choice lands adjoining Tigrai, i.e., from Wollo, and Gonder and included them within Tigrai proper. Furthermore, using that old and worn-out method of divide et empera, a method that all minority regimes attempting to rule over a nation much larger than themselves have historically utilized, the TPLF has fragmented the country much as the apartheid regime in South Africa did. Anyone who knows anything about the TPLF regime's dogma since its creation knows that the "uniting" of all Tigrinya speaking people into the Greater Tigrai orbit to be ruled by them has been the centerpiece of their bizarre and eclectic "ethno-marxist" ideology. At the very heart of the conflict was, therefore, the furtherance of this design of the TPLF. In May 1999 the Woyane regime thought that it had pacified the rest of Ethiopia enough that it could proceed with the second phase of its "Greater Tigrai" program. It is for the implementation of this scheme that the TPLF regime picked a fight with Eritrea seriously miscalculating both its own ability, rather lack thereof, and Eritrea's resolve. To the regime's ideologues, Eritrea was there just waiting for the picking. No sooner than it embarked on the anti-Eritrean campaign, the regime began to whip-up traditional Ethiopian patriotism, patriotism it had previously associated with what it called "Amhara-chauvenists." It is almost comical to see when this very same people, who were fond of deriding the Ethiopian flag as nothing more than a "piece of rag", now shamelessly shrouding themselves with it. How is one to explain the regime's newfound patriotism and claims of "Ethiopia's 3000 year of proud history" when we all know that it made a sport of ridiculing the very notion until the eve of the conflict. What Ethiopian will forget their deafening howling of the "great Amhara myth," and their claim that Ethiopia had a history of only 100 years?The truth is bound to finish off the Woyane regime A key element of the OAU Framework Agreement is that an investigation would be conducted into the events prior to May 6, 1998 to establish culpability for instigating the conflict. If peace comes, The TPLF would then have to explain its series of calculated and provocative acts prior to the above events. The claims of Eritrea that Woyane operatives "murdered in cold blood unarmed Eritrean border patrols approaching them to discuss tension in the area" on the above date may after all have validity. This was supposedly the event that triggered the conflict. The TPLF would have to explain its military occupation at Adi Murug a year earlier which was supposedly officially undertaken in "a hot pursuit" of some Ethiopian Afari armed opposition group. The TPLF has to explain why and on what basis it unilaterally redrew a new map of Tigrai in 1997, making serious alterations to the preexistent map. The key question is who started the war? The only answer the whole world can attest to is that it was the Ethiopian rubber stamp "parliament" that hastily declared war while the Eritrean cabinet soon after countered by putting forth what in all fairness could be termed as specific, fair and detailed proposals to end the conflict. The regime followed this declaration with similarly bizarre actions and did it in a dizzying pace. But because the TPLF regime was bent on war in pursuit of the above-mentioned scheme, it put one hurdle after another to make sure that peace did not stand in the way of their scheme. The most ridiculous demand was that Eritrea withdrew unconditionally and unilaterally from territories the TPLF regime steadfastly refused to specify. Once war started, the bombing of Mekele by the Eritrean Air Force in which innocent children were killed has effectively been used by TPLF to arouse public indignation. To this day, the people of Ethiopia are being bombarded by a propaganda line that claims Eritrea's action to have been deliberate and unprovoked. As sad an event as the death of the children was, the cumulative evidence now seems to clearly indicate, that the TPLF sent fighter planes, and bombed Asmara first; that the action of the Eritreans was purely retaliatory; and the killing of the children accidental. The TPLF regime, of course, conveniently avoids any mention of Eritrea's prompt apology for the unfortunate incident. If peace were to be signed, the TPLF would have to explain to the people of Ethiopia its extravagant and false claims of military victory. Following the battle for Badime in February 1999, the regime's inept mouthpiece, w/o Selome Tadesse, in her characteristic mix of lies and braggadocio had unabashedly told the Ethiopian people and the entire world that "two thirds of the Eritrean fighting capacity had been vanquished. She shamelessly told the world that all that remained was a mopping up operation." Some "mopping up!" Of course, we now know that all the hullabaloo and the celebration was a trifle premature. Critical pieces of evidence have since brought to light of the carnage Ethiopia suffered at Badime. The TPLF would have to explain why they were unable to retrieve any of the land they claim Eritrea to have invaded if they had achieved such a military feat. It is obvious to any half-witted observer that Meles & co. are no closer today to achieving whatever it was they set out to accomplish than on the day they declared war and sacrificed so many people and Ethiopia's meager resources. The only way the regime can prolong its hold on power is by making sure that the truth would never come out. And the achievement of peace will surely expose these leaders, if further exposure is needed, to their true color. The Regime had promised the Ethiopian People more than it could deliver.If the war supposedly started as a result of a border conflict, what the local media focused upon from the very outset has been something entirely different. In the first several months after the conflict broke out, the most familiar refrain on Radio Woyane in Mekele was this: "Eritrea has 3.5 million people and two ports. Ethiopia, on the other hand, has 60 million people and no port. Why, then, can't Ethiopia take one?" The implication of this rhetorical question is quite clear. It shows beyond a shadow of doubt, the very minimum objective was never the return of that village of Badime, but rather the "return" of Assab. This point was clearly underscored when Dr. Alemu Tekeda, the Deputy Foreign Minister announced to a cheering crowd in Washington D.C., "You will soon hear good news. Ethiopia will have its own port." Well now, how is the TPLF regime going to explain its debacle in that attempt too? When the TPLF discovered that its quest for Assab was easier said than done, in a typical Woyane fashion of getting mired in an incoherent policy, it shifted its tack and told the Ethiopian people that for peace to be achieved the sha'bia regime in Asmara would have to be toppled. It planned to install a "play-dough" puppet regime. Laughably, the TPLF has shown no promise here either.Ethiopia has benefited nothing from all the precipitous actions Meles & co. has undertaken.The week the government announced the purported invasion of Ethiopia by Eritrea with great uproar, I, as many Ethiopians, was befuddled by all that the announcement entailed. Strangely, instead of trying to diffuse the situation, the regime followed up its announcement by a shrill diplomacy of ultimatum, and a barrage of actions I thought were quite out of sync, to say the least. What were the TPLF leaders thinking when they so abruptly announced that Ethiopia would henceforth boycott the use of the ports of Massawa and Assab? What did Massawa and Assab have to do with Badime? Did these people really think that they could bring Eritrea down to its knees by such a boycott? In fact what the TPLF regime did by this strange action was scrapping at one fell swoop Ethiopia's well-established doctrine of "outlet-to-the sea" which it had carefully crafted since immediately following World War II. The doctrine, it goes without saying, had served Ethiopia well until the day the present rulers of Ethiopia trashed it with little foresight and understanding of its implications. What were the essential points of the doctrine? In a memorandum presented by the Imperial Ethiopian Government to the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1945, Ethiopia had declared the great importance Massawa and Assab held to her as follows, "Today [1945], the port of Massawa is of the greatest importance for the economic life of Ethiopia. It is through it alone that the four great and densely populated provinces of Tigre, Gonder, Wollo and Gojam can be supplied with their needs for imported goods, and it is the only port through which their exports of hides, coffee and other agricultural products can find an outlet to the sea. In fact, the prosperity and very economic life of the whole northern half of Ethiopia depend entirely upon free access to the sea for its produce through Massawa and Assab." The vicissitudes of politics might have changed, but the reality of geography has not. What is more, Ethiopia stated the above clear and unambiguous doctrine to the powers to be while at the same time it had access to the port of Djibouti. Ethiopia did this fully realizing that Djibouti did in fact play a key role, albeit secondary. The new claim that "Djibouti is Ethiopia's natural outlet to the sea" is, therefore, only half-true and half a case of sour-grape. The same people, who today tell Ethiopians that Massawa and Assab are inferior ports anyway, and too expensive to boot, with the same flippancy that has become their trademark, have a great deal of explaining to do. They are the very same characters who had been trying to convince us that Ethiopia had lost nothing by Eritrea's independence since Eritrea had made the unimpeded use of Assab and Massawa by Ethiopia its top priority. They were in the habit of lauding the various so-called mutually beneficial agreements, the memoranda of understandings, etc. that were being signed between the two countries. I am aghast when looking at the glowing remarks these same leaders were making not too long before the outbreak of hostilities about the great quality and superior services Ethiopia enjoyed at Assab and Massawa. Logic 101 tells us that two contradictory statements cannot be both true at the same time. Now, the TPLF would have to explain which "fact" is the "truth" and which is a lie. If peace is achieved, then the Woyane leaders would have to either persist in the boycott, much to the detriment of Tigrai and "the entire northern half of Ethiopia," or they would have to go back to Eritrea in the penitent's ashes and sack clothes. They would nevertheless have to explain to the people of Ethiopia why they undertook such a dangerous and self-defeating gamble in the first place. What I find even more perplexing about the TPLF regime's lack of farsightedness was its raising of the ante by discontinuing all flights to and from Eritrea by the Ethiopian Airlines, Eritrea's major flyer at the time. When one considers that the Addis Ababa-Asmara route was EAL's most profitable line, one would have to wonder about the motive of such an irrational action. Was this supposed to be the TPLF's ace in the hole, the silver bullet, if you will? Again, the ever-elusive goal of the regime was to bring pressure to bear on Eritrea - bring it to its knees in the shortest time possible. Now, fifteen months later, what has the result of EAL's boycott been? Except for a few days of inconvenience for Eritrea, all the profitable services of the Ethiopian Airlines have been taken over by an ever-expanding list of competitors such as Lufthansa, Egypt Air, Saudi Air, and Yemen Air. What is more, the action goaded Eritrea to seek internal and external investors into launching its own small airline, Red Sea Air, with a growing fleet. According to some reliable sources within the Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopia is said to have lost business amounting to the tune of $600million a year. If and when peace is achieved, and it will sooner or later, and by hook or by crook, the TPLF government would have to explain this too. Doesn't it then make sense for them to just avoid peace altogether?The expulsion of ethnic Eritreans and the issue of compensationIf one were to turn the pages of Ethiopian history to honestly look at all the injustices we have perpetrated on the people of Eritrea we can perhaps understand our own frailty and past failings. We will discover that we are, as any other, people with many skeletons in our closet. I have often considered Eritreans magnanimous for not going back to past injustices they had suffered and make a career out of nursing old wounds. Let me mention only a couple here. Our own Ethiopian historian Ato Tecletsadik Mekuria in his book entitled 'Atse Menelik'na yeityopya andenet' tells us of our gruesome past, a past we can't possibly be proud of. Following the battle of Adowa, Ethiopia had many Italian and Eritrean POWs in her hands. While the European POWs were treated so well, the cruel and inhumane "punishment" meted out against the Eritrean POWs is something that defies all common decency. Egged on by the likes of Ras Mengesha, Alula, Abune Matewos, et al, Menelik had the right hand and left foot of all 1,200 Eritreans hacked off. Those who survived this indescribable horror crawled back to Eritrea. This happened only two days after the battle was over and in the heat of passions - perhaps a lesson the TPLF should have learned for a not-so- well-thought out, spur-of-a-moment actions. Ethiopians know very little about the countless atrocities committed in Eritrea by the Derg in the more recent memory. Again, it is a credit to Eritreans that they have not rushed to put up memorial 'hawlt" at every site of mass murder and mass grave in Eritrea. Contrast this to what the TPLF seems to be in the habit of doing to remind whomever they considered their enemy (which is much of Ethiopians) of one thing, "Look what you had done to us. Therefore, don't complain about anything we are doing to you now!" I have never heard Eritreans harping about the horrible role Tigrayans played in the cities and towns of Eritrea in the 1970s and 1980s. Tigrayan residents in Eritrea ran all the kebeles as Eritreans showed no inclination or interest in serving the Derg. It was these Tigrayans who served as dutiful hatchet men in the regime's security apparatus there. Consequently, countless Eritreans were imprisoned, tortured and killed by the Tigrayans who lived in the midst of Eritreans. The Tigrayans knew the language and culture so well, and they so eagerly used their familiarity with the Eritrean society to commit so much atrocity. The TPLF regime has made a conscious decision to use the regrettable incident at Mekele for its own political end and to promote hatred and revenge. It will add a useful perspective to recall another similar incident that took place in 1990, admittedly incomparably greater in its extent. After the EPLF captured Massawa in a stunning military victory, the Ethiopian air force unleashed a senseless blanket bombardment of that beautiful city into what one observer compared to the complete destruction of the city of Dresden in the final days of WWII by the allied air. The world media showed with horror as hundreds of children, old men and women were buried under the rubble in Massawa. Strangely enough, what I find quite amazing about the wanton destruction of Massawa is not that Ethiopia committed this unspeakable act simply out of spite, but the noble reaction of Eritreans. Today, when they speak of Massawa's ruin, Eritreans do not focus on what was "done to them," but how they have miraculously rebuilt and transformed the city to its glorious past, the pearl of the Red Sea, and much more. Only those who have seen the city recently will appreciate this statement. Compare this with the reaction of the TPLF to the sad incidents at Howzien and Mekele. They used it to promote hatred and a sense of a need for vengeance. None of what Eritreans have historically suffered in the hands of successive Ethiopian regimes, however, would come close to their present and on-going massive arrest, confiscation of property, and mass-expulsion out of this country they have often called their home for generations. This unprecedented and diabolical act augurs bad omen for Ethiopia. For months after the beginning of this practice, many of us were willing to sit back and regurgitate the official propaganda line of the Ethiopian government. "Well," goes the innocent-sounding apology, "Isn't Eritrea doing exactly the same thing? Eritrea, it was reported, did "expel" 30,000 Ethiopians out of Assab. It sounded so true at the time. The truth was, however, much less complex than that. The majority of the population of Assab was Ethiopian. The port was Eritrean only in name, since the port essentially served Ethiopia's needs. The large numbers of workers at the port, as were the shopkeepers and traders, were Ethiopians. In fact, four of the schools at Assab used Ethiopian curriculum and were staffed by some eighty Ethiopian teachers.The minute Ethiopia boycotted the port, therefore, the initial victim was not Eritrea, but the tens of thousands of Ethiopians who had lived and worked in Assab. Since they were deprived of their means of livelihood by Ethiopia's unexpected action, many became destitute and chose to go back to Ethiopia. These, the TPLF regime orchestrated as "expellees", and we, blinded by our own prejudices and hatred, lapped up whatever the TPLF propaganda machine threw our way. Now, fifteen months have passed. We know the facts, indisputable and unadulterated facts. Let us for a moment put aside the propaganda line of Meles & co. and examine what is independently confirmed. The most recent Amnesty International report on the situation is the most damning piece of evidence. It clearly states that there is no reciprocal action on the part of Eritrea, and that there is no official campaign of harassment or expulsion by the Eritrean government. This conclusion was clearly corroborated by many other independent sources, such as, the Klein Report, the reports of the representatives of the UNDP, and the European Union. The statements by US State Department and that of Mary Robinson of the UN Council on Human Rights were not made out of the blue and without investigation of the facts either. Perhaps the most up to date and the most scientific study of this human tragedy is the one compiled by none other than the eminent Prof. A. Legesse. In his report - "The Uprooted" - we can readily see how low we have been brought as a people. This unprecedented action by those who rule Ethiopia against innocent citizens to me raises Hemingway's singular alarm bell - "For whom the bell tolls..." Or, in the words of Atse Haile Selassie spoken at the League of Nations 65 years ago, "Today it is us, tomorrow it will be you." Yes, it is Eritreans today, but who will be next in line? By what we have done to Eritreans, the dreaded ethnic genie of the Balkans is already out of the bottle in Ethiopia. No one could possibly put it back in. Everywhere you go in Ethiopia, "Get out of our kilil" has already become an oft-heard clarion call. If peace returns, Eritrea will, as surely as day follows night, demand that Eritreans whose property was confiscated be compensated. President Afeworki's recent remarks on his most recent tour of the US makes this clear. The documentation for such redress, I am quite sure, is well underway. Eritrea has already intimated that it will bring the matter before the International Court of Justice. Ethiopia, with over 5 million of its citizens on the verge of massive starvation, is in no position to pay back hundreds of millions of dollars. You can't squeeze blood out of a turnip. What is more, too many people have benefited from the misfortune of Eritreans who were expelled. Much of the property is distributed among TPLF's own cadres. Do you think these people would be willing to relinquish their newfound wealth? I don't think so. That's why the TPLF, from the top echelon down to the bottom, would rather see the war continue than face the indignity of giving up what they have taken by force and treachery. Ethiopia has lost too many lives, and absolutely nothing to show for it.If you don't agree with anything I have said so far, this is, I hope, where we can't possibly have any disagreement: Ethiopia has lost too many of her sons in this war waged only to further the narrow interests of those who rule Ethiopia. Forget foreign journalists, but why do you think that the Ethiopian press itself is effectively barred from covering the war? Why aren't even members of the-rubber-stamp parliament allowed from setting foot in Tigrai? If no other site, why did the Ethiopian government at least not show Badime? Worse yet, why are the men in the Ethiopian armed forces in the trenches of Tigrai held in absolute incommunicado? The answer is clear as day. The TPLF leaders do not want the truth to come out. And should peace come these same leaders would be forced to do much explaining to the widowed wives, the orphaned children, and the grieving mothers and fathers.The utter incompetence of those who rule over Ethiopia today is clearly seen by their anachronistic military thinking and strategy, the foolishness of which has astounded the world. The carnage Ethiopia suffered at Badime for questionable "gain", the gruesome picture of the thousands who were slaughtered at Tsorona and other fronts is already well known for all but those whose head is still buried in the sand. It would be instructive here to reckon back to the days of the Tigrai people's struggle and how these same people conducted themselves in 1991. As the loved ones of those who joined the struggle anticipated the fate of their young children who left home to fight, the TPLF dashed their hope by giving them no news. The TPLF simply told the people of Tigrai, "If your children haven't come back, just forget about them. It means that they have died." I am afraid that many a loved one in this sad country of ours will soon be told exactly the same thing. The TPLF regime which finds it self between the Scylla of the sure wrath of the Ethiopian people when peace is restored and all the truth comes out, and the Charybdis of continuing this stupid war, all the indications they have given us so far lead to only one conclusion. As destructive as the war may be, they see no future for themselves in a peaceful Ethiopia. They will, therefore, continue on their self-destructive path. ConclusionIt takes only guns to rule. But it takes statesmanship to lead a country of any size and description. It takes an extraordinary statesmanship to particularly lead a country as vast, complex, diverse, and backward as that of our own. And, unfortunately for Ethiopia, a dearth of statesmen is her historic woe. Ethiopia endured seventeen years of war and destruction with the Dergue's foolhardy motto of: "There ain't no horse that can't be rode; there ain't no man that can't be throwed." For the present leaders, as for the Dergue, the poor of Ethiopia who are conscripted into the army by force have been treated as something akin to a disposable item. I cringe when I hear people like Gebru Asrat make incredible statements that, "This war will continue for generations." It is déjà vu all over again when a leader sees the future only in such a distorted prism, and proclaims to a nation, "Regardless of the sacrifices the war must continue!" One should be cognizant that these same leaders who make such morbid remarks have their children sent abroad to a life of luxury and opportunity. When they talk about "sacrifices", therefore, it is the sons of the peasants and the poor who have historically been used as cannon fodder that they are so eager to sacrifice. Peace? TPLF? I, for one, am not holding my breath. But where do we go from here? It is, I believe, the historic duty of every patriotic Ethiopian to stand united to save Ethiopia from itself and the path of inevitable destruction, and even fragmentation under the present rulers. For Ethiopia, Eritrea is not, nor has it ever been the problem; the TPLF is. We have let the TPLF pull wool over our eyes for too long. We should see them for who they are - enemy numero uno. Ethiopians cannot simply entrust the future of the country to people who have shown little regard for it; people who have given us enough reason to believe that they don't have concerns beyond their own narrow ethnic preoccupations. We need to side step the TPLF and look for true, genuine, and alternative peace. Let us start with facing the truth, because only the truth will set us free. |
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By Prof.Habtamu Bihonilign September 3, 1999 bihonilign@hotmail.com I do not think it's necessary for me to start this article by trying to convince anyone of what is, by now, most obvious; i.e., the fact that Ethiopia is hell-bent on pursuing a military "solution" to the present conflict between Eritrea and itself. If anyone who claims to have been following recent events has not come to this realization, I can only say that such a person is in a decidedly receding, if not disappearing, minority. Of late, the government has abandoned even the slightest pretension of hiding behind the familiar "peace" phraseology. Ethiopia's initial official response to so-called "Technical Arrangements" clearly stated that as far as it was concerned, Ethiopia's oft-repeated military option (with a "capital M") still held utmost priority in the thinking of the TPLF leaders. This stance was reiterated by Mr. Abay Tsehaye, a senior politburo (a strange term in 1999 - a throw back to the old Soviet days) member. He declared as much in a closed session held for the benefit of TPLF sympathizers in the "comrade's" most recent visit to the US. Without mincing words, he stated, "We [the TPLF] must break Eritrea's back militarily first." This article will examine the futility of such thinking. 1. Who in Ethiopia is particularly pushing for the military "option"? When the conflict initially made headlines, the reaction of most Ethiopians, as I am sure of Eritreans as well was utter disbelief. It hit us all like a blot of lightening. "What in heaven's name just happened?" was the question that dropped out of the mouths of most peoples'. For those who understand the destructiveness of war and for those to whom the past bloodletting is still fresh in their memories, the news of hostility breaking out had to have been the horror of all horrors. What made this development difficult to accept was that many in Ethiopia, despite the dissatisfaction over the divisive ethnic policies of this government, were growing used to the notion that Ethiopia might have finally outgrown war. It didn't take very long before the Ethiopian parliament dashed the people's hopes and offered its fateful ultimatum and the subsequent declaration of war on June 13, 1998. Regardless of which party to the conflict was at fault, the action of the parliament was hasty, at best. It got the country into an intractable diplomatic and military logjam. From that point on, those who deliberately instigated the conflict have spoken of "peace" only in so far as it served them as a smoke screen for their war preparations. Again, to have a better understanding of the 'modus operandi' of the war-mongering clique in Addis Ababa cum Mekele, one would have to look at the two distinct messages they put out about their intentions. What the local official government media churns out for the citizens, and the press releases of the Foreign Ministry designed for foreign consumption have always been contradictory. While the latter, until recently, paid a confused lip service to peace, the former never even bothered at such attempts and stuck to that most familiar monotone script, "We will annihilate Eritrea." Once the euphoria of deceptive promises and the anxiety resulting from being "invaded" dissipated, divergent, disturbing and cynical views soon emerged among various segments of Ethiopians. Many of those who had accepted the independence of Eritrea, not necessarily out of principle but only as a 'fait accompli', easily reverted to their former anti-independence views. Those, who with some legitimacy and mostly Amaras, had never accepted the TPLF as a 'bona fide' government, much less the independence of Eritrea, were often heard making a cynical remark. "Oh, Good!" they said, "The Tigrayans and Eritreans will now finish each other off for us." The cynicism of this view rests in the fact that its proponents perceive war between two countries as something easily containable within certain sub-groups in one's own country and easily manipulate it to suit one's short-term political agenda. Once begun, war, they forget, is like a prairie fire taking a life of its own. Another new group soon emerged from nowhere. These are people who have never experienced first hand, the devastating effects of war. They view it as something akin to a horseshoe game at a Sunday afternoon picnic. This group, often too distant to know the horrors of past wars, has a tendency to see the conflict as mere Nintendo game. I have been disheartened to see this new generation of "electronic warriors" whose specialized "military training" is limited to video arcades had the temerity to go so far as offering their "expert" advice on military strategies from a world away on how to conduct and win the war against Eritrea. The dangerousness of this group lies in their naivete and gullibility. I see them often being used by those who know exactly what they are doing. The die-hard militarists have consistently been those within the ranks of the TPLF, with the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) at the core. This is the cabal that controls every facet of life in Ethiopia today. The reason for this group's sworn position to forge ahead on the warpath is discussed in a previous article. It suffices to mention here that behind all the facades they put up, all of this group's decisions and actions are predicated on achieving their all too familiar and historic "Greater Tigrai" scheme. This is the one and only 'casus belli' - not the border, the economy, etc. As time wore out, and to an increasingly lesser degree, the satellite organizations within the EPRDF have taken an ambivalent and vacillating stance. The support these organizations offer is largely due to the fact that they owe their existence and their extremely limited powers in their respective 'kilils' (regions) to the TPLF - their creator and patron. 2. Eritrea is an anvil that has worn out many hammers The government of Atse Haile Selassie embarked upon its attempts at "solving" the Eritrean dilemma militarily. It began this policy simultaneously with its scrapping of the Ethio-Eritrean federal arrangement. The thinking at the time was quite simple. Pacify the Eritrean opposition among the intelligentsia and the labor unions by overawing and overpowering them with military and police presence. This, it was thought, would take care of things in no time. What followed, of course, was something entirely different. As all means of expression of dissent were muffled and the opposition were killed, jailed, or exiled, the anti-Ethiopian reaction in Eritrea began to take the form of armed struggle. The 1960s was a period in which the Eritrean peoples' struggle dealt with two important issues. While on one hand the struggle grew by lips and bounds commensurate to the repressive measures instituted by the government; on the other hand, the movement's internal contradictions were being exacerbated. In the very early 1970s the Ethiopian student movement, the issues surrounding the famine in northern Ethiopia and the varied socio-political crisis throughout the empire attained the requisite internal critical mass necessary for the collapse of the 'ancien regime'. In the final analysis, however, it was the 2nd Division of the Ethiopian armed forces stationed in Eritrea, which had long borne the brunt of the ever-growing military casualty that got the ball rolling. In their long list of grievances, the army correctly concluded that the war in Eritrea could not be solved militarily. They became the first organized body in Ethiopian history to jettison the notion of military solutions for problems that can and should be solved politically. With support from other segments of the armed forces, these also became important catalysts for the overthrow of the monarchy. The coming of the dergue did show initially the promise of peaceful resolution in Eritrea. Even if it is short lived, resolving the Eritrean problem peacefully became the new mantra - a shibboleth. It didn't, however, take too long for the clique within the PMAC, led by Colonel Mengistu, to usurp power and change the course of events. It is not within the scope of this article to analyze either the emergence, the internal dynamics of the dergue, or the Ethio-Eritrean war, which ended in 1991. The point of focus here is simple. By 1976 the new military leaders of Ethiopia, again with Mengistu Haile Mariam at the helm, had reversed the anti-war views and concluded that Ethiopia's war in Eritrea was winnable. To do so, what Ethiopia needed, in their thinking, was more men and weapons. Armed with this belief, the dergue led Ethiopia on another steeplechase. For seventeen years the Mengistu regime sacrificed scores of thousands of men and squandered a lion's share of the country's meager resources - all for naught. Mengistu persisted on the military option right up to his down fall. There is no doubt that his demise, as that of the monarchy before him, is directly linked to the war in Eritrea. It is important to note here that the 1989 attempted military coup d'etat by the best and the brightest in the military top brass, mainly those stationed in Eritrea, had an uncanny resemblance to the events of 1974. The leaders of this unsuccessful bid to overthrow Mengistu had just as correctly concluded that the war in Eritrea could never be settled militarily. These leaders experienced their own epiphany following that fateful Battle of Afabet, which David Basil likened to the debacle at Dien Bien Phu. Unfortunately for these generals, their ineptitude and the sabotage by opportunist elements in their midst resulted in their wholesale massacre by Mengistu. These days there are unconfirmed reports that even old Mengistu has thrown in his two-cents worth on issues of war and peace from his exile in Harare (before he left for N. Korea, that is). He supposedly shared his belated "wisdom" by stating, "If we [the dergue] couldn't win that war with all that we had, what makes the fools in Mekele think they can!" If this "latrine rumor" has any kernel of truth in it, I say, "Hurrah!" for the human spirit. It just might be possible to teach that old dog a new trick after all. 3. Changed equation: the futility of the military "option". Nothing can show the futility of the military adventurism of the present Ethiopian government than a brief comparison and contrast of the present situation to that of the era of the dergue. This comparison is of crucial importance in that it shows Eritrea is today the strongest it has ever been since the beginning of its armed struggle almost forty years ago. Now, I know this is a hard fact to swallow to many. Be that as it may, conversely, Ethiopia's relative position and strength has precipitously declined to its weakest point since the 1980s - the period in which Ethiopia had transformed itself into a veritable military state with the help of the Soviet Union and other powerful benefactors. At the height of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia had close to half a million man under arms, led by some of the best trained and ablest generals and officers. According to reliable military intelligence reports, during this period the Ethiopian government was pronounced as having the largest and best-equipped air force in the continent south of the Sahara, South Africa excepted, of course. It possessed the largest number of tanks and armored personnel. The Soviet Union considered the Mengistu regime its most trusted ally in the continent and spared no effort to assure not only its survival but its unquestionable dominance in the continent as well. Mengistu got anything and everything it asked for in the form of military hardware, training, and advice - no question asked. The eleven billion-dollar debt Ethiopia incurred during this time, mainly for the purposes of waging the war in Eritrea, is a living testimony to that commitment. During this same period, Eritreans were outnumbered four to one in ground forces. The Ethiopian air force was indisputably in full control of the skies, with a major air force base in Asmara and other smaller ones and airstrips throughout. All the cities and towns along with 70%-80% of the civilian population of Eritrea were controlled and administered by Ethiopia. Ethiopia also was in uncontested possession of Massawa and Asseb, Eritrea's two strategic ports, as well as the 1000 kilo meter coastline. This had enabled Ethiopia to become a major maritime nation in the region with a relatively strong navy. On top of all this, the Ethiopian government tightly controlled and utilized practically every aspect of Eritrea's economic resources. Ethiopia's own command economy was geared to bolster the war efforts of the government. Diplomatically, despite the fact that the Ethiopian-Eritrean war was by far Africa's longest and most devastating, Ethiopia's insistence that the conflict was "its own internal affair" had found wide and unquestionable currency. Consequently, the OAU, the UN, Europe, the United States, etc., much to Ethiopia's liking, were content to look the other way as the country hemorrhaged. Except for a few journalists that managed to slip through the Sudan, Ethiopia made sure that Eritrea was completely closed off to journalists and foreigners in general. Not surprisingly, during much of the war Eritrea remained as isolated internationally as heaven is from hell. On the other side of the equation, Eritrea was mired in internal squabble and a civil war. The Fronts had withdrawn from most of the territories they had occupied by 1978 and retreated to the redoubts of Sahel in northern Eritrea. It is there that the EPLF regrouped its forces and concentrated on defending its base area from Ethiopia's massive, concentrated, and repeated military campaigns without any of the above mentioned advantages Ethiopia enjoyed. Reading through some of the most thrilling and important works on this particular period by scholars we can't simply dismiss as Eritrean propaganda, one could reasonably conclude the following. If ever there were a time for Ethiopia to impose its will on Eritrea by force of arms, this period would have had to be the most optimum. Ethiopia had in its grip all the advantages anyone embarking on any war could ever wish. On the other hand, the Eritreans seemingly had all the disadvantages one could possibly wish on one's enemy. Yet it wasn't to be. Eritrea overcame Ethiopia's relentless military campaign and finally triumphed. The Eritrea of 1999 is a far cry from ten years ago - not "your grandfather's Oldsmobile" anymore, to borrow from GM's commercial. The equation is reversed radically. Never mind those who have been tantalizing us for the past fifteen months that another war with Eritrea would be a walkover this time. For anyone who wants to look at the cold, hard facts, today's picture is a whole different ball of wax. Look at the results so far, if any illustration is needed. The days when Ethiopians were told by their previous governments that the problem in Eritrea involved only a few "wenbediewotch" (bandits) is over. Leaders who might dare try to paint the conflict today as "Arab instigated and supported", as the former governments somewhat successfully did, would be laughed straight out of town. Today, Ethiopians, with some exceptions, have by and large resigned themselves to the reality of Eritrea's independence. Diplomatically, Eritrea is a sovereign nation and recognized as such by the community of nations. Unlike during the previous war, the country is in full control of its territory, including the ports of Massawa and Asseb. It possesses a small but respectable air force and a navy. It has an experienced, well-trained, and disciplined army the number of which closely matches that of Ethiopia. Reading independent assessment of its economy by the same international organizations that assess Ethiopia's using the same measuring rod (the IMF, the World Bank, UNDP, etc.), Eritrea doesn't seem to be doing bad at all. The entire population Eritrea appears to be more united in common purpose today more than at any other time in their history, and unlike most other countries in Africa. The Eitrean government is far more popular among its citizens than is the case with the minority regime in Ethiopia. If anyone is in doubt about this, as many TPLF propagandists who like to dream up the worst about Eritrea would have us believe, just refer to the recent unbelievably warm reception they gave their president during his visit to the US. When was the last time an Ethiopian leader received such a welcome by its people? It is to be remembered that Ethiopians who couldn't stand the sight of Mr. Meles Zenawi in his last visit to the US showed their contempt by pelting him with rotten tomato. Compare this to the way Isayas, the man certain Ethiopians love to hate, mixes with his own people within and outside of the country without any fear for his life - or of rotten tomato. If the many newspaper accounts we read about him are half-true, he is often seen in the most public places in Asmara without the accompaniment of any security personnel - mind you, even when they are in a state of war!. When was the last time any Ethiopian has ever seen Prime Minister Meles Zenawi or any of MLLT's politburo members taking a leisurely stroll beyond the confines of their heavily fortified palace? Think about this the next time that you refer to Isayas as a "dictator". Remember this the next time you shade crocodile tears for the people of Eritrea for living "under the heavy yoke of his rule." This, in any case, is none of our business. Let Eritreans worry about that. 4. Prologue For 40 years and a thousand times over the death knell of Eritrea has been sounded, the funeral procession formed, the inscription cut on the tombstone, and committal read - all too prematurely. In 1969 the London times and many other prestigious newspapers wrote their epitaph for the end of the armed struggle following adverse reports of internal squabble within the ranks of the Eritrean liberation movement. When the USSR threw all its military and diplomatic weight behind the Mengistu regime, or against the Eritrea, The New York Times in 1978 had declared the Eritrean rebellion "over and done with." As the dergue's much vaunted, no holds barred Red Star Campaign, waged to put an end to the war in Eritrea once and for all, was under way no one gave the Eritreans a fighting chance. As everyone saw it, the dergue had put all the manpower and economic resources of Ethiopia, not to speak of that of the USSR, Cuba, Korea, South Yemen, the GDR and the other East European Soviet satellite states, to administer what all had predicted to be the 'coup de grace'. Mengistu was sure that it had put all its ducks in a row for the anticipated and decisive finishing blow. Many a pundit looked at the balance sheet and again prematurely wrote the obituary for the Eritrean peoples' armed struggle. And to be honest, who could blame them! The obvious arithmetic of the forces arrayed against each other was convincing enough - one David against many Goliaths. Even in the most recent war, using the same old flawed arithmetic, many had concluded and strangely some still do, that Eritrea was too small a country for the next door behemoth. Eritrea, however, remains the same anvil that has worn out many Ethiopian hammers. If the past is any indication, as I wholeheartedly believe it is, Ethiopia's present third-rate hammer will fare no better on that same anvil. The dergue refused to learn a lesson or two from the mistakes of the preceding government. Ethiopia paid for it dearly. Now, the discredited minority government in Ethiopia/Mekele has learned a great deal from its predecessors. The sad thing is that, as a reading of the government's plagiaristic script shows, it has learned all the wrong lessons. As a consequence, it is bound to repeat the same deadly mistakes. The result this time, however, can be a catastrophe of epic proportion Ethiopia will never be able to dig itself out of. The sooner we learn this lesson of great import the better off we will be before the country finalizes its downward spiral into the Balkan-style fragmentation. This process, which has already been enshrined in the Woyane constitution, is well underway on the ground as well. Let me try to make my point with a simple illustration. My brother-in-law, a successful and middle aged business man related to me an interesting story. He could no longer go to Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), just an hour's drive from Addis to conduct business. "It has a feel of a foreign country with all the attendant linguistic and cultural barriers," he lamented. I am not one to believe even for one minute that Eritrea is the culprit if Ethiopia splinters into its many constituent pieces. I am not buying this propaganda line, which seems to have recently replaced the "we-are-victims-of-invasion" line. Eritrea never wrote Ethiopia's constitution. Eritrea never drew up a map of Ethiopia carving it up into the ethnic enclaves or "kilils". The TPLF government did all that without anybody's help. If we have already started looking for a "fall guy" for what appears to be inevitable, look no farther than a certain address in lower 'Arat Kilo' with a forwarding address to Mekele. For the recidivist elements and the war-mongers in Ethiopia that are intent upon turning back the wheels of history, I say, "Wake up, and smell the coffee." Your case is hopelessly out of tune with the wishes and interests of the Ethiopian people. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH! And if you think that the sons of Ethiopia will keep on bleeding for your pie-in-the-sky dreams, my parting word of advice to you is this: "mikerew mikerew embi kale mekera rasu yimkerew." |
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Ethiopia and Eritrea On "Round Three" Prof. Habtamu Bihonilign Bihonilign@hotmail.com October 7, 1999
The year and a half mark is fast approaching since the Ethiopian government announced to our people and the international community that Eritrea had invaded Ethiopia. Before anyone was able to digest the full impact of this ominous announcement, the Ethiopian government, on May 13, 1998, declared war for what it said was "to protect the sovereignty of the nation." Since that time there have been two major rounds of military undertakings by the Ethiopian government. Mr. Negasso Gidada, Ethiopia's president, has once again assured the world in his national address on the occasion of Ethiopia's New Year that his government will yet again have another go at it - not exactly the way Ethiopians would have wanted to usher in another year. What makes such a development hard to swallow is that this war is not necessary. The peace plan sponsored by the Organization of African Unity has the full support of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and the rest of the international community. What is more, Eritrea has accepted the proposal from stem to stern. Until Ethiopia at the very last minute unexpectedly reversed itself, it too had on several occasions had lauded the peace plan as the only viable solution to the conflict. This article will look at the outcomes of the first two rounds of battles, and shed light on the futility of the promised 'Third Round'. I. Round One: (June 1998) The first set of battles was fought three weeks after our government announced that Ethiopia had been invaded. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi appeared on national television and declared that he had "given instructions to the country's armed forces to take the necessary steps to defend Ethiopia's sovereignty." Ethiopia advanced two conflicting objectives at the time, depending on whether one was listening to Radio Woyane or Ethiopian officials in Addis. While the former intimated that there was no stopping before reaching Assab and Masswa, the latter seemed to more often speak of pushing the Eritreans to some undefined border. As a prelude to the 'First Round', an incomprehensible reorganization was effected in the armed force's command structure. Instead of the Ethiopian Defense Ministry being the body to conduct the planned war, a whole different entity, which dubbed itself "The War Council" was established. The Council almost exclusively consisted of Tigrayans who had hitherto run Ethiopia in one form or another, politburo members of the TPLF, as well as top officials of the Tigray Administrative Region. All others were effectively excluded from any decision-making positions and kept very much in the dark. In so far as the time frame to accomplish the above confused objective was concerned, the government told Ethiopians that the mission would be accomplished within fortnight. A Tigrayan friend of mine at the time "assured" me that "this is not going to be like the previous long and expensive war." "The TPLF," he whispered in my ears "has an altogether different strategy - quick in and quick out." Whatever that meant, it was clear to everyone that the War Council had envisaged a decisive military victory over Eritrea in as little time as two weeks. In the aftermath of 'Round One' any thinking Ethiopian - any thinking human being - will then have to ask one important question. What did Ethiopia accomplish in the first round of battles? Nothing! ABSOLUTELY NOTHING is the unequivocal answer. If Eritrea's taking over of Badme had been the cause of the initial conflict, Zalambessa and Bure were all of a sudden added to the list of territories Ethiopia claimed as being occupied. How did Ethiopia's new claims now extend to Zalambessa and Bure? As soon as the War Council unleashed one offensive after another on Eritrean positions from the Badme Plain to the Assab front, the Eritreans responded by striving for military advantages by controlling important strategic heights. Paul Harris, a military intelligence analyst, writing for Jane intelligence Review, said at the time: "The Eritreans quickly overwhelmed the Ethiopians at Zalambessa and repulsed a drive [Ethiopia's] for the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab, pushing themselves around 30km into Ethiopian territory." According to Ms. Suzan Rice, the US Assistant for African Affairs, speaking before the House Committee on International Relations affirmed that "after several weeks of fighting the Badme area and areas near Zalambessa and Bure, south of the port of Assab fell under Eritrean control." Whatever Ethiopian territory Eritrea might be controlling today is, therefore, the result of the first round of battles, now seemingly held for war-time strategic expediency, and not because of any particular claims. Eritrea has on several occasions publicly stated that it is ready to withdraw from all the contested areas in the context of the implementation of the peace proposal by the OAU. The point here is that the War Council failed miserably in its attempts to bring about solutions to the conflict by force of arms within 2-3 weeks following the outbreak of hostilities, as was envisaged. The question at the time became what the War Council would do next. Would it opt for a peaceful resolution of the conflict or continue insisting on settling it on the battlefield? II. Round Two: (February-March 1999) Following the above battles, outspoken members of the War Council began to put a spin on the debacle of the first round. The Council's first attempts at declaring a strange sort of victory didn't pan out very well with the Ethiopian people. TPLF/EPRDF's well-greased propaganda machine then immediately set about attempts at explaining away the fiasco. They concocted a simple plan, which surprisingly admitted to the military defeat, but with extenuatory explanations. They went on to argue that there were good reasons for the failure - that Ethiopia wasn't as prepared militarily as it should have been. And the reason they advanced for their failure to make the necessary preparation was that all the government's energies were directed at the country's economic development. Amazingly, the Council succeeded in convincing Ethiopians that Eritrea, on the other hand, had been preparing for war since its independence. Never mind the fact that Eritrea had been lauded by the west in her radical demobilization program before this conflict begun. Even the most lettered folks in Ethiopia were parroting the newest and most absurd propaganda line of the government which purported to explain Eritrea's alleged invasion. The Council and their spin-doctors told us that Eritrea waged a war in order to divert the people's attention from the serious economic problems the country faced. Such attempts at explaining Ethiopia's "victim-hood" flies in the face of hard reality. No one wanted so much as to glance at the glowing reports of the IMF, World Bank, et al, on the phenomenal achievement of the Eritrean economy prior to the conflict. Furthermore, can any reasonable person believe that a small country, supposedly having serious economic problems, would find it easier to invade a country several times its size than doing something else to solve its supposed economic problems? Now, Reagan might conceivably invade little Grenada for whatever domestic political reasons. Can one think of a scenario in which Grenada attempting to invade the United States "to divert attention" from its internal problems? Excuse the absurd comparison, but the answer is, "Quite unlikely!" If the reason for the defeat in 'Round One' could be explained in Ethiopia's forgivable ill preparedness, and if Ethiopians could be convinced that Eritrea invaded Ethiopia to divert the attention of its people from some internal problems, the Council could now make another pitch. This it did with surprising ease. It convinced the people of Ethiopia that with better preparation it could achieve the ever-shifting objectives in 'Round Two'. Luckily for the Council, most Ethiopians bit the bait. Between June 1998 and February 1999 the Council mortgaged the future of Ethiopia by acquiring every imaginable military hardware in the international weapons bazaar. A huge army, reminiscent of the derg's era, was recruited and trained. As zero hour approached in February, the Council was boasting that Ethiopia had made all the necessary preparation to "teach Eritrea a lesson it will never forget". The objective of this mission was the exact replica of the previous one - variegated and confused. One thing, however, was sure. The Council, this time as before, confidently believed that a quick and decisive military solution was within grasp. Sadly, many Ethiopians had already forgotten the similar propaganda of the derg, promising the Ethiopian people the stars. They had forgotten the most recent propaganda line of 'Round One'. Again, with 'Round Two' far behind us, it is only logical to ask what Ethiopia has gained for all the material and human sacrifices it has paid. Again, the answer is NOTHING! As I write this article, I am reading a piece by a writer for Chicago Tribune reporting from the Eritrean side of Badime. Believe me, what we have there is a checkmate, at best. Let me not even mention the unmentionable "T" word (as in Tsorona). The very sound of the word sends a cold shiver down any Ethiopian spine. The position at Zalambessa remains fixed where it has been since the end of 'Round One'. There has not been an inch of change on the Bure front either. To the credit of "the well planned surgical bombing of our Air Force", the Council did manage to blow the roof off a storage shed at Massawa, even if it missed the port itself. By any measure of all the publicly stated objectives the Council so confidently set for itself, to say that 'Round Two' was another embarrassing disaster of the highest magnitude will only be an understatement. Where does the War Council plan to take Ethiopia next? Its spin-doctors have come up with yet another catch phrase designed to prepare Ethiopians for yet another round of battles, 'Round Three', while at the same time giving the impression of victory in earlier rounds. Perched high up either on the hills of Addis Ababa or the sundry academic ivory towers abroad, the sages of the Council and their allies tell the Ethiopian people. "Let us finish off what we have started." They say this without the slightest twinge of conscience. Few things in life, I believe, are as dangerous as believing one's own lies. One cannot finish that which one has not started. III. Round Three (due anytime soon) While the objectives of 'Round Three' do not seem to have changed much, few new phrases are added. What is said to have precipitated the conflict has seen dramatic change. The Council has of late been swearing that the conflict has never been about borders. Its reasoning for this somersault is simple. All the efforts at achieving peace thus far are based on the source of the conflict being just that - a border conflict. By claiming that it is not, it makes it easier in the Council's thinking to derail the entire peace plan. What is significantly different about the anticipated 'Round Three', however, is Ethiopia's explicit resort now to a prolonged war rather than the brief, decisive and "blitzkrieg" strategy, which characterized the attempts of the first two rounds. The apparent abandonment of this notion of quick, decisive victory is a stark admission by the War Council of the absolute failure of its military ventures thus far. The question one must ask here is not whether or not Ethiopia will pursue a military option. For that, the die is already cast. The fact that the catastrophic results of the first two rounds have shown beyond the shadow of doubt that a military solution is simply another will-o-the-wisp matters little to them. Here, let me briefly outline the utter foolishness of prolonging the conflict. How long is a prolonged war? Have we forgotten the death and destruction the thirty-year war with Eritrea brought Ethiopia? What will be different this time? Let us put the bravado of the Council aside for a moment, and put Ethiopia up to a mirror. The mirror never lies, you know!
Ethiopia is not an industrial country that is
able to produce any of the war implements that it uses. Everything in its
arsenal is bought with precious hard currency. The country is one of the
most heavily indebted countries that must use much of its export earnings
to service its debts. To make matters worse, Ethiopia's export has seen
an alarming decline lately. Listening to the boastful claims of Ethiopia's
leaders, however, one can almost confuse the country with a super power.
Nothing more attests to the havoc such development is about to wreak on Ethiopia than the unusual and frank admission by Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin in his most recent speech to the UN General Assembly. Among other countless strange statements, he admitted that "the punishment meted out [on Ethiopia] has had almost no limits..." And he accuses "the IMF which suspended its cooperation with Ethiopia" and that "the EU, other institutions and countries [that have] joined the bandwagon." Mr. Seyoum - "You ain't seen nothing yet!" And welcome to the world of reality. Why does the world seem to finally side with Eritrea?
It is because Ethiopia, by its irrational rejection of peace, has delivered
the moral high ground to Eritrea on a silver platter. Now the international
community perceives Ethiopia as not committed to peace. By comparison,
Eritrea's leaders sure have the look and sound of champions of peace, worthy
of the Nobel Peace Prize.
Here is an anecdotal illustration of the degree of support Ethiopia received from its people in the Diaspora even at the height of the hysteria. Some seventy self-appointed "representatives" of "a million Ethiopians living abroad" were flown to Ethiopia with much pomp and circumstance to hand over less than three quarters of a million dollars they managed to collect hither and thither. Once in Ethiopia, these self-styled "representatives" were paraded throughout the country as heroes, and even given audience with the Prime Minister for that. Compare this with what a couple of hundred Eritreans
in the very mid-size city I live and work managed to do in one evening.
They collected almost as much as the amount that was raised from "the million
Ethiopians" to support their country's war effort. Report has it that Eritreans
the world over have managed to raise over a hundred million dollars since
the outbreak of the conflict. This does not include the 400 million dollars
their country is supposed to rake in for the year in remittance receipts
alone. This is almost as much hard currency as Ethiopia gets in its annual
coffee export - in a good year, that is.
The thirty-year struggle of the Eritrean people, on the other hand, has taught them an important lesson about how their army should be composed. The army becomes dear to the society if it is composed of all the citizens - a citizen army much like that of Israel or Switzerland. They come from all sectors of society, the privileged and not so privileged, the cities and rural villages, men and women, college educated, the shopkeeper, etc. As a consequence of such a composition, the army becomes the heart and the soul of the country, enjoying tremendous support. In a war of attrition, therefore, such an army is much more likely to wear out its opponent. I know somebody is bound to interject here, "how about our numerical preponderance? Doesn't it count for anything?" True, number counts; but only as a secondary consideration and only when all the other important variables are in place. Remember that Ethiopia had the same numerical and many more advantages in the thirty-year war. And yet, not only did the country suffer ignominious defeat militarily, but also sustained unimaginable economic, political and social consequences. If our own past experience is not sufficient,
perhaps another important lesson in this regard could be drawn from the
USSR's venture into Afghanistan. Here was a super-power with seemingly
limitless war-making capability - immense wealth, military industrial complex,
and its population several times that of Afghanistan. The result, as is
well known, was catastrophic for both. The USSR never recuperated from
that disaster. In fact, the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan in no small
measure contributed to its final dissolution. - a great metaphor for the
present situation in Ethiopia Worse yet, Russia failed to learn from this
experience, and repeated the same mistake in 1996 when it waged war against
tiny and backward Chechnya.
War, without a doubt, is always devastating. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Neither will come out of this war a winner. When peace is finally achieved, the scars on both countries will most assuredly last for generations. I say this lest some might misconstrue this comparative assessment as one that elevates Eritrea's apparent advantages to a point of suggesting that Eritrea will go unscathed. It will. It is in this context that I say waging war for thirty years with little outside help has taught Eritreans to become defiantly self-reliant. They have fine-tuned their policy of self-reliance during the past nine years, turning it into a science. I personally have my own reservations about Eritrea's ejecting of almost all foreign NGOs out of their country in 1996 and 1997, which was perhaps a forgivable indiscretion of a young country, or a hasty act of a maiden who has just come of age. One, nevertheless, can't help but admire their courage and long-term outlook. No other third world country has ever taken such a bold step. In the two years after Eritrea's independence, the army and those who run the country volunteered to work without any compensation. The huge army that is in the trenches today can go on fighting for years without salary and even complaint. This is the national ethos Eritreans have developed and others would want to emulate. The short and long end of it is that Eritrea will put this great experience to use once again. And such self-reliance will give them a clear edge in outlasting our "aid-dependent" existence. Ethiopia is now at a crossroad. It can choose war and get itself in more trouble than it can never get out of; or it can choose peace with honor. The experiences of the past year and a half clearly teach us that talk of prolonging the war is not going to yield any better result. It is foolhardy. Violence will have to be renounced once and for all, and countries must learn to settle differences peacefully. How can both countries extricate themselves from this "loose-loose" situation? Is there any way out of this morass? Can Ethiopia and Eritrea be courageous enough to put an end to this cruel war that should never have happened in the first place, and get back to the business of the other war that must be waged - the war against poverty? I don't think there is any other choice. There is already a peace proposal on the table, which I believe gives both countries a way out. One party seeking to humiliate the other can never achieve lasting peace. The world has learned that bitter lesson at Versailles following World War II. For peace to be lasting, it has to be fair and honorable. Neither the people of Ethiopia or of Eritrea are asking to be the victor. What they are calling for is peace. That is all. And the only way of achieving peace is by signing on to the peace proposal that is already before us. All else is a pipe dream. Write your comments about this article to the author at Prof. Habtamu Bihonilign Bihonilign@hotmail.com |